Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown. Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. The conflict will likely remain at a lower intensity in the short term, with neither side currently assessing that renewed large-scale operations are in its interests. However, as long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly been derived from its ability to interdict transit through the SoH, and that leverage has likely been recently degraded. The establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast, the widespread adoption of night-time dark transits, and the rerouting of substantial Gulf export volumes away from the SoH entirely have likely restored a notable although still significantly reduced proportion of regional export capacity. Reported transit and export volumes are likely higher than publicly tracked figures indicate, due to the use of dark transits and ship-to-ship transfers. Concurrently, the launch of Operation Economic Outcast on 24 August almost certainly removes any near-term prospect of sanctions relief for Tehran.

The combination of degraded maritime leverage and intensified economic pressure likely increases the incentive for Tehran to escalate militarily, both to demonstrate that the SoH cannot be transited without its consent and to restore its negotiating position before its remaining leverage is further diminished. Iranian offensive escalation over the coming weeks is therefore a realistic possibility. It is highly likely that Iranian forces will intensify attacks against vessels using the southern corridor, and there is a realistic possibility of attempts to place further mines on the approaches.

Attacks against Gulf state energy infrastructure, ports and airports, as well as US military installations, would represent a more significant escalation. The risk of this is likely to increase as Tehran comes under greater economic pressure, particularly given direct threats against regional energy infrastructure by Iran’s new SNSC head, Rezaei. Rezaei’s specific reference to export routes bypassing the SoH likely indicates that Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea infrastructure at Yanbu, alongside pipeline, port, and loading infrastructure in the UAE (particularly at Fujairah), are being framed by Tehran as legitimate targets if it assesses that the Gulf states are supporting the US economic campaign.

Pakistani and Omani diplomatic activity in Tehran on 24 and 25 August likely reflects continued attempts by regional powers to prevent the collapse of the diplomatic track. However, with no direct US-Iran channel in place, Iranian preconditions highly likely unchanged, and Washington committed to escalating economic pressure, a near-term breakthrough is unlikely. The Iran-Oman track on the management of the SoH remains the most likely source of progress, although Iranian officials have consistently stated that an arrangement with Oman would not by itself reopen the strait.

The Houthi-claimed strike against a Saudi tanker west of Yanbu on 24 August is consistent with the pattern of attacks against Saudi-linked shipping conducted since the Houthi maritime blockade was declared on 20 July, although notably north in the Red Sea. Further attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, and limited attacks against energy infrastructure and airports in southern Saudi Arabia, are highly likely in the short term. Further short-notice air raid siren activation, shelter-in-place instructions, and closures of Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports should be anticipated at minimal notice.

Continued intensified conflict between Saudi-backed IRG forces and the Houthis continues to represent the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce, and the risk that either side initiates a ground offensive remains elevated. A ground offensive by either party would highly likely result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis highly likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran, and deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of the kingdom also highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: