Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown. Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. The conflict will likely remain at a lower intensity in the short term, with neither side currently assessing that renewed large-scale operations are in its interests. However, as long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

The US announcement of an intensified economic campaign, combined with Bessent’s statement that maximum economic pressure would likely preclude a restart in large-scale kinetic operations, likely indicates that the Trump administration is pivoting towards economic coercion as its primary instrument against Iran in the short term.

The principal escalation risk from the announced economic campaign is that the removal of any near-term prospect of sanctions relief likely reduces Tehran’s incentive to preserve the MoU framework, and likely increases the risk that Iran escalates militarily in order to impose costs and compel a return to its understanding of the MoU. Iranian officials stated on 17 August that Tehran had shifted to an offensive posture and threatened retaliatory action within weeks if the US failed to implement the MoU in full. Tehran is likely incentivised to exploit the widely reported US munitions shortage before the US has the opportunity to regroup and regenerate capability. This may result in intermittent Iranian attacks designed to force the US into further ammunition expenditure.

Furthermore, if the disclosed numbers transiting the US-controlled southern corridor in the SoH are accurate, this likely reduces the immediate economic pressure on the US to conclude a deal on the SoH, and increases Tehran’s incentive to further escalate attacks against vessels and/or escalate kinetically in other areas.

The ballistic missile warning issued in the UAE is the first such alert in months, with a false alarm in June and an alert in July for an attack that did not enter Emirati territory. The last confirmed Iranian attack against Emirati territory was in May. Iran has likely refrained from targeting the UAE more recently in the conflict for economic reasons, with the UAE having reportedly released billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets, after having targeted the UAE with the most projectiles of any country in the region.

Prior to the current war, the UAE was Iran’s second largest trading partner after China. The implementation of a comprehensive trade and commerce embargo would almost certainly impose economic costs on Iran and likely indicate a hardening of the UAE’s posture. However, it remains unclear whether the Emirati MFA statement marks a tangible change in policy, or simply restates earlier publicly adopted policy in anticipation of further US sanctions on Iran. As of 21 August, Iranian flights continue to arrive in the UAE. However, if economic ties are significantly curtailed, Iran may have fewer incentives to exercise restraint towards the UAE, likely increasing the risk of renewed Iranian targeting during future escalation cycles.

The IRGC’s threat to deploy more destructive weaponry in a renewed conflict likely refers to an increased scale and complexity of missile and drone attacks, including larger salvos, manoeuvrable warheads and potentially cluster munitions with an extended kill radius. However, the IRGC has not stated what constitutes a renewed conflict or specified the threshold at which these capabilities would be employed. Should the conflict sustain its current intensity, it is unlikely that cluster munitions would be used directly against the Gulf states and Jordan due to the threat of escalation. However, in the event of a further major escalation, their use cannot be ruled out, with unconfirmed reports indicating that Iran previously used a cluster munition warhead against Bahrain on 14 July. Iranian cluster warheads release dozens of submunitions at high altitude, dispersing them over a radius of several kilometres. The use of cluster munitions almost certainly increases the risk of civilian casualties, in addition to leaving large quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Claimed limited Houthi attacks against an Aramco facility and Najran airport in Saudi Arabia on 20 August almost certainly reflect continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure and airports, with further such limited attacks highly likely in the short term. Moreover, continued intensified conflict between Saudi-backed IRG forces and the Houthis continues to represent the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce, and the risk that either side initiates a ground offensive is likely increasing.

Claims that the Houthis have deployed approximately 2,000 fighters and rocket launchers to Yemen’s western coast in preparation for an advance south of Hodeidah, if confirmed, would likely indicate the intent to seize terrain overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The successful seizure of this key terrain would almost certainly improve the Houthis’ ability to disrupt maritime traffic and further threaten Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export route.

Commentary from Yemeni political figures indicates that Saudi Arabia is likely marshalling IRG forces to prepare for a range of contingencies without having taken a final decision to initiate a ground campaign, and that any Saudi-backed push would most likely focus on Hodeidah, through which the Houthis import Iranian arms. An operation against Hodeidah would almost certainly result in major Houthi retaliation against Saudi Arabia.

The launching of a Saudi-backed ground offensive against the Houthis or a Houthi ground offensive against the internationally recognised government (IRG) would highly likely trigger a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and attack drone strikes against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis would highly likely target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran, and deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of the kingdom would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: