Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

The competing US and Iranian maritime blockades continue as of 14 August, with President Trump’s previous statements on “low-keying it” with Iran referring to continued economic pressure against the regime as opposed to major combat operations. The Trump administration currently highly likely regards the US blockade as its primary means of exerting leverage over Tehran to compel compliance. Likewise, Tehran almost certainly sees disruption to transit through the SoH as its primary form of leverage.

US CENTCOM has previously conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels in the SoH. These are typically followed by Iranian retaliation strikes launched against targets in regional states, particularly US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, while Iranian attacks against vessels transiting the SoH near Oman outside of Iran’s enforced routes have continued, US strikes have not recently followed these attacks. This likely reflects a current prioritisation in the Trump administration to avoid a full return to conflict and instead attempt to achieve an opening of the SoH through the ongoing Iran-Oman talks.

US freedom of action against Iran has highly likely been constrained by the considerable depletion of US offensive and defensive munitions during the war. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a 60-day or more reprieve on SoH transit will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran.

Continued divergence in Iran’s negotiating position from different figures is likely attributable to factional competition in Tehran. The absence of a fully coherent regime in Tehran almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with or purposely undermine any agreement made by Iran’s civilian government and negotiating teams, as observed after the signing of the MoU.

Iranian forces have almost certainly exploited any US cessation of strikes to improve their offensive and defensive positions. This has likely involved the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, the importation of new equipment, and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should regular active fighting resume.

Fundamentally, the conflict has likely now entered a lower-intensity phase in which neither party currently assesses that renewed large-scale operations are in their interests. The US is highly likely constrained by munitions shortages and is ostensibly prioritising economic pressure through the blockade, while Tehran is almost certainly exploiting the pause to regenerate capability and retains the closure of the SoH as its principal source of leverage. Consequently, a formal lapse of the 60-day truce period on 17 August is unlikely in itself to trigger an immediate resumption of large-scale strikes, and a de facto pause would likely persist without any publicly declared extension. However, the situation almost certainly remains fragile with multiple triggers for rapid escalation, particularly the ongoing maritime blockades.

The claimed 13 August Houthi attack against an Aramco refinery in Jazan almost certainly reflects continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, with further such attacks likely in the coming week. This assessment is further reinforced by warnings from Houthi media on 11 August that attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure would be expanded if Saudi Arabia continues to “stall” diplomatic efforts, with such attacks highly likely to be the primary form of leverage the Houthis can impose against Saudi Arabia.

The escalation in fighting between Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) forces and the Houthis, with further exchanges of shelling and strikes observed between 13 and 14 August, is almost certainly the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce. The concentration of fighting in Marib, al-Jawf, and Taiz corresponds closely to the axes along which Houthi forces were advancing before the truce. The Houthi use of ballistic missiles and UAVs against Marib city and the port of Mocha likely indicates an intent to degrade Saudi-backed IRG command, logistics, and maritime resupply in preparation for potential full-scale renewed fighting, in addition to a likely intention to deter a potential Saudi-backed ground offensive.

The most likely trigger for a major escalation remains a Saudi-backed IRG ground offensive against Houthi-controlled Yemen, although a Houthi pre-emptive offensive to seize Marib before IRG forces can be reconstituted is also a realistic possibility. Both of these scenarios would highly likely result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: