Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

Greater control over the SoH has almost certainly been a long-term objective for Tehran. Control would not only give the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees, but bolsters its deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having almost certainly been its most important source of leverage in the conflict. Tehran’s insistence that an arrangement with Oman will not by itself reopen the SoH almost certainly reflects an intent to retain that leverage until wider concessions are secured.

Continued divergence in Iran’s negotiating position from different figures is likely attributable in part to factional competition in Tehran. The replacement of Zolghadr with Rezaei on 9 August likely reflects an attempt to consolidate control over decision-making and highly likely strengthens Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-aligned influence over any agreement reached. The absence of a fully coherent position in Tehran almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with or purposely undermine any agreement made by Iran’s civilian government and negotiating teams, as observed after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

The competing blockades from both the US and Iran remain in place as of 11 August. Previously, US CENTCOM has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels in the SoH, with Iranian retaliation strikes then being launched against targets in regional states, particularly US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, while Iranian attacks against vessels transiting the SoH near Oman outside of Iran’s enforced routes have continued, US strikes have not recently followed these attacks. This likely reflects the Trump administration’s current prioritisation of securing an opening of the SoH through the ongoing Iran-Oman talks.

Military constraints deriving from the depletion of a considerable percentage of both US offensive and defensive munitions in the war thus far have highly likely limited US freedom of action against Iran. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term as a means to end the conflict, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a 60-day or more reprieve on SoH transit will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran.

Iranian forces have almost certainly exploited any US cessation of strikes to improve its offensive and defensive positions, as supported by an Iranian military spokesperson who openly stated on 2 August that Iran “fully exploited” the MoU to improve its capabilities. This has likely involved the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, the importation of new equipment, and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should regular active fighting resume. Moreover, it is likely that a restart of US CENTCOM operations against Iran characterised by the targeting of Iranian infrastructure would trigger retaliation strikes targeting regional energy infrastructure, ports and international airports.

The claimed postponement of Iraqi militia retaliation on 7 August was likely a product of Iraqi domestic political pressure rather than a decision by Tehran to de-escalate, most likely reflecting the interest of Shia Coordination Framework parties in avoiding further US-Saudi strikes and in protecting the PMF’s position ahead of the government’s 30 September deadline for placing all weapons under state control. The IRI has stated explicitly that the decision is a deferral, and Iraqi militias almost certainly retain both the capability and the intent to strike Saudi and US targets. Any resumption would highly likely occur with minimal indicators and warnings.

Attacks originating from Iraqi territory would most likely target energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province and Riyadh, replicating the drone attacks that Riyadh attributed to Iraqi militias in late July, and there is a realistic possibility that these would be deliberately coordinated with Houthi attacks from the south. Simultaneous attacks from both northern and southern axes would likely force Saudi Arabia to disperse aircraft, radar, and air defence systems across multiple directions, potentially overstretching air defences and exposing gaps in coverage.

Continued Houthi attacks against Saudi-linked vessels, southern Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-backed Yemeni IRG forces almost certainly demonstrate the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which will highly likely remain as long as the Houthi “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia is enforced. The 9 August strike against the Jazan refinery indicates that the Houthis are highly likely to continue targeting Saudi energy infrastructure.

A Saudi ground offensive into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen would almost certainly result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: