Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Despite a relative reduction in US strikes against Iran and concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.

Greater control over the SoH has almost certainly been a long-term objective for Tehran. Control would not only give the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees, but bolsters its deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having almost certainly been its most important source of leverage in the conflict. If accurate, the Iran-Oman proposal being reported as close to agreement would essentially give Tehran the ability to leverage passage through the SoH to advance its objectives for at least a 60-day period. This has been strongly opposed throughout the conflict by the US and several regional states, with this dispute having likely been the key trigger for the collapse of the MoU.

Reporting regarding the potential SoH agreement has been contradictory, with no text having been published and conflicting information being briefed. In part, the divergence in briefings is likely attributable to Iranian factional competition. On 4 August, a senior hardliner politician in Iran stated that lawmakers were gathering documents for the impeachment of Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, and a senior cleric with family connections to the Supreme Leader said on 3 August that President Masoud Pezeshkian has been warned his next resignation request would be accepted. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with or purposely undermine any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government and negotiating teams.

The competing renewed blockades from both the US and Iran remain in place as of 7 August. Previously, US CENTCOM has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels. If further such strikes are conducted, these would highly likely be followed by Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in regional states, most likely US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain given recent target prioritisation by Iranian forces.

Military constraints deriving from the depletion of a considerable percentage of both US offensive and defensive munitions in the war thus far have highly likely limited US freedom of action against Iran. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term as a means to end the conflict, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a 60-day or more reprieve on SoH transit will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran.

As demonstrated since the end of the 13 consecutive nights of US strikes against Iran on 24 July, with numerous subsequent attacks originating from Iraq being conducted against regional targets, the IRGC is likely to continue leveraging regional proxies to inflict sustained pressure on the Gulf states while remaining below the calculated threshold for significant escalation directly against Iran.

Iranian forces have almost certainly exploited any US cessation of strikes to improve its offensive and defensive positions, as supported by an Iranian military spokesperson who openly stated on 2 August that Iran “fully exploited” the MoU to improve its capabilities. This will likely involve the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, the importation of new equipment, and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should regular active fighting resume. Moreover, it is likely that a restart of US CENTCOM operations against Iran characterised by the targeting of Iranian infrastructure would trigger retaliation strikes targeting regional energy infrastructure, ports and international airports.

Continued Houthi attacks against Saudi-linked vessels, southern Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni IRG forces almost certainly demonstrate the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which will highly likely remain as long as the Houthi “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia is enforced. Saudi-Houthi tensions have almost certainly rapidly further deteriorated, with the Houthi targeting of Yemeni IRG forces in particular likely linked to earlier reporting regarding joint Saudi Arabia-IRG preparations for a potential ground offensive against the Houthis.

A Saudi ground offensive into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen would almost certainly result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Moreover, as reflected in the warning given by a senior Saudi official, an escalation in attacks against Saudi Arabia may be characterised by simultaneous attacks from both Houthi-controlled Yemen and Iraq, and may occur regardless of whether a ground offensive is launched against the Houthis. A renewed northern attack axis would likely force Saudi Arabia to disperse aircraft, radar, and air defence systems across multiple directions, potentially overstretching air defences and exposing gaps in coverage.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: