Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Thirteen consecutive nights of high-intensity US strikes from 11-23 July were highly unlikely to have sufficiently degraded Iranian long-range military capabilities or compel it to agree to US demands. Iran has pursued a strategy characterised by the increased use of proxy forces, enabling it to sustain regional pressure, preserve its remaining missile and drone capabilities, and reduce the exposure of launch sites inside Iran.

However, Iran has also conducted limited direct ballistic missile attacks in recent days, including missile strikes against US forces in Jordan, demonstrating that it retains the capability and willingness to escalate directly, restore deterrence, or respond to renewed US military action. These attacks have likely demonstrated Iran’s ability, whether directly or indirectly, to sustain a region-wide campaign despite increased military pressure.

Kuwait has been the Gulf country most targeted by Iran during this period of escalation, and one of the most targeted throughout the conflict. It is likely that, at this point in the conflict, Iranian officials assess that striking Kuwait entails a lower risk of retaliation compared to launching major strikes against states with larger conventional forces like Saudi Arabia or the UAE, as these have also demonstrated the willingness to strike Iran or Iran-affiliated groups. It is, however, likely that the targeting of a Chinese-owned building was unintentional and possibly the product of a targeting error. While Iran has repeatedly targeted locations hosting foreign workers in the Gulf, the recent escalation period has been limited to US military facilities.

The 29 July drone attack on US-owned vessels in port in northern Egypt also illustrates the continued reach of Iran and its allies beyond the immediate Gulf conflict zone. The Damietta strike, likely conducted by the Yemeni Houthis, was likely aimed at demonstrating to regional powers Iran’s ability to inflict economic damage and disrupt commercial operations beyond the immediate vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz. Notably, the strikes occurred as Saudi Arabia is seeking to redirect oil shipments from the BaM to the Suez Canal.

The announcement of the MMDA with the participation of 14 states, including several regional powers, was highly likely prompted by the intensification of Houthi activity and the strikes on Damietta Port, which expanded the regional scope of the conflict. However, it also reflects the overall interest of Gulf States in maintaining the region’s international waterways and preventing Iran and Iran-backed groups from establishing effective control over them.

Reports of Houthi operations alongside Iraqi Iran-aligned groups would, if confirmed, highly likely indicate increased coordination between members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”, as well as growing Iranian investment in Iraq as a staging ground for operations targeting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Iraq’s importance for Tehran has almost certainly increased since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and joint operations rooms between Iran-aligned Iraqi militias and the Houthis have existed since at least 2024, with the groups previously carrying out joint attacks against Israel.

Saudi Arabia’s position in Yemen has likely improved following the January 2026 offensive that led to the collapse of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council, and the capture of Aden by the Saudi-backed government forces. However, carrying out a military offensive against the Houthis would almost certainly expose several Saudi cities, as well as critical energy infrastructure, to Houthi targeting.

The collapse of the pause in strikes almost certainly reflects the ongoing fragility of the situation in the region, with the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) having de facto broken down over currently irreconcilable differences between the US and Iranian positions, with control over the Strait of Hormuz remaining the main obstacle to a viable agreement.

It is likely that the competing blockades, as well as the growing involvement of the Houthis and Iraqi militias in the conflict, are increasing the risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the region. A further geographical expansion of Iranian attacks, or a sustained increase in strikes against Saudi territory, is likely to prompt additional Saudi or US-Saudi strikes against Iran-backed forces in Iraq and/or Yemen. Direct Gulf-state strikes on Iranian territory remain unlikely. However, there is a realistic possibility that an attack causing substantial casualties or damage to critical infrastructure would trigger retaliation, although such action would carry a significant risk of accelerating region-wide escalation. Iran has highly likely factored this risk into its targeting decisions, with its acknowledged strikes since 28 July primarily directed against US military facilities hosted by regional states rather than those states’ own military or civilian infrastructure.

Both the US and Gulf States’ freedom of action is likely to be constrained by the expenditure of munitions, including missile interceptors, throughout the war. Growing air defence shortages will likely degrade Gulf States’ ability to sustain continued Iranian attacks and will likely improve the penetration rates of attacks from Iranian proxy groups in Iraq and Yemen. Iranian forces are likely to continue leveraging regional proxies to inflict sustained pressure on the Gulf states while remaining below the threshold for significant escalation.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: