Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Despite the pause in US strikes against Iran and concurrent pause in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown with minimal indicators and warnings. Critically, it is highly likely that the key trigger for the breakdown of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), continued Iranian attempts to exert long-term control of the SoH, remains extant.

The competing renewed blockades from both the US and Iran officially remain in place. As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. Any US kinetic activity against Iran-linked vessels and/or a direct confirmed Iranian attack against a vessel transiting the SoH likely risks a rapid return to a cycle of US strikes against Iran and Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in the Gulf states and Jordan.

The US pause in strikes has likely been conditioned first by an assessment that the intensity of US strikes being conducted had reached the limit of their effectiveness. For context, the US struck approximately 1,000 targets during the recent 13 consecutive nights of bombing, primarily against assets in southern Iran around the SoH (although they did notably likely expand in geographic scope near their conclusion), compared to 13,000 targets in the war’s initial phase until 8 April. According to unspecified sources briefing US media, the CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper recommended to President Trump to cease operations around the SoH due to an exhaustion of possible designated bombing targets.

Second, the expenditure of US munitions through the war, particularly air defence interceptors, has been so great that this is likely acting as a constraining factor on US freedom of action. Open source estimates indicate that the US used around a third of its total pre-war stockpile of precision munitions in the war against Iran, up to 80 per cent of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) air defence interceptors and 61 per cent of Patriot interceptors. Also according to unspecified sources briefing US media, the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Dan Caine, has privately warned that a shortage of air defence interceptors could lower the ability to counter Iranian strikes against US forces and allies in-region. However, Adm. Cooper has reportedly countered that escalated US strikes would degrade Iranian capabilities sufficiently to counterbalance the limited stocks of air defence interceptors.

Iranian forces are almost certain to exploit a US cessation of strikes to improve its offensive and defensive positions, particularly around the SoH currently. This will likely involve the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers, and the restoration of damaged systems such as coastal radars. Iranian military units are likely to regroup, disperse remaining assets, and reposition forces to further enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should active fighting resume.

The IRGC is likely to exploit the use of regional proxies, particularly Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq, to continue low-level attacks against regional states. The attack drones intercepted over Jordan on 27 July, for example, were likely launched from Iraq. Following the implementation of a ceasefire on 8 April, several attacks were conducted in the following weeks which were attributed to Iranian proxy forces in Iraq. These forces likely offer Tehran the capability to sustain kinetic pressure while maintaining plausible deniability and remaining sub-threshold for significant escalation.

Alternatively, the Houthis in Yemen are almost certainly not under the same level of control by the IRGC as other regional Iran-backed groups, and are overall likely to continue pursuing objectives against Saudi Arabia autonomously from the broader US-Iran conflict. Houthi strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure will highly likely follow any further Saudi strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen conducted in retaliation for Houthi attacks against Saudi-flagged vessels. However, the compounding Houthi threat to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, alongside continued disruption in the SoH, highly likely continues to increase Tehran’s leverage through the simultaneous disruption of two critical maritime chokepoints.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: