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US-Iran Conflict Escalates Across Gulf Civilian Infrastructure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 21 July 2026 – 24 July 2026
- Between 21 and 24 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several more rounds of strikes against Iran up to its thirteenth consecutive night overnight 23-24 July. Iranian forces on each occasion launched retaliation strikes against claimed US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Air raid sirens were additionally briefly activated in Dammam, Saudi Arabia on 22 July, although it remains unconfirmed whether Saudi Arabia was directly targeted.
- On 22 July, US President Donald Trump threatened that each time Iran attacks a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, the US will destroy an Iranian bridge or power plant. Senior Iranian politicians, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-affiliated media each threatened retaliation strikes against energy infrastructure targets across the region.
- The previously announced Houthi maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia has now materialised into kinetic activity, with Houthi attacks against two Saudi Arabia-flagged oil tankers on 22 July. Houthi attacks on Saudi-linked vessels likely raise the risk of Saudi strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen, which would in turn likely prompt further Houthi attacks against Saudi territory.
- On 23 July, President Trump stated in an interview that he is considering an attack larger “than ever before” against Iran. US officials briefed that no decision has yet been made or orders given on the launching of an expanded operation against Iran.
- On 23 July, the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) upgraded the travel advisory rating for both Kuwait and Bahrain to advise against all but essential travel.
- As of 24 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, numerous flight cancellations have followed the resumption of attacks.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: US-Iran Conflict Enters New High-Intensity Phase
Between 21 and 24 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several more rounds of strikes against Iran up to its thirteenth consecutive night overnight 23-24 July. The US strikes increasingly struck targets outside of southern Iran, marking a geographic expansion of US targeting. Iranian forces on each occasion launched retaliation strikes against claimed US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Air raid sirens were briefly activated in Dammam, Saudi Arabia on 22 July, although it remains unconfirmed whether Saudi Arabia was directly targeted.
On 22 July, US President Donald Trump threatened that each time Iran attacks a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), the US will destroy an Iranian bridge or power plant. In response, an IRGC commander threatened that there will be “power outages” across the region following Iranian retaliation strikes, and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbass Araghchi stated that targeting of Iranian infrastructure would “compel a powerful and decisive response” under the “eye for an eye” doctrine. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media specifically threatened that the Al Taweelah power plant in Abu Dhabi and Jebel Ali Power Plant in Dubai, UAE, the Ras Laffan Power Plant in Qatar, and the Riyadh Power Plant in Saudi Arabia could be targeted in retaliation for US strikes against bridges or power plants.
On 22 July, the Houthis released a statement claiming to have executed an operation targeting two Saudi Arabia-flagged oil tankers, the ENCELIA (IMO: 9240172) and the LAYLA (IMO: 9336098), using “a number of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones.” Saudi media reported that an attack caused a fire on the bow of ENCELIA, and the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Centre issued a warning that a tanker was struck by a projectile 70NM southwest of Al Shuqaiq, KSA, with no reported casualties.
On 23 July, President Trump stated in an interview that he is considering an attack larger “than ever before” against Iran. US officials briefed that no decision has yet been made or orders given on the launching of an expanded operation against Iran.
On 23 July, the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) upgraded the travel advisory rating for both Kuwait and Bahrain to advise against all but essential travel.
As of 24 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, numerous flight cancellations have followed the resumption of attacks.
On 14 July, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB) which recommended that air operators should: “Not operate within the airspace of Bahrain (Bahrain FIR – OBBB), Kuwait (Kuwait FIR – OKAC), Qatar (Doha FIR – OTDF), the United Arab Emirates (Emirates FIR – OMAE), and the airspace over the waters of the Gulf of Oman within the FIR Muscat (OOMM)”. The notification is valid until 29 July.
Saudi Arabia
Air raid sirens were briefly activated in Dammam on 22 July. The emergency alert coincided with Iranian attacks against nearby Bahrain, and it remains unconfirmed whether Dammam and its surrounding areas were directly targeted by Iranian strikes. However, regime-affiliated Iranian media reported attacks in Saudi Arabia; the King Abdulaziz Air Base in Dhahran is located just south of Dammam. If confirmed, this would be the second Iranian attack against Saudi Arabia since April 2026, following the limited attack on 18 July.
On 22 July, US President Trump approved a deal to help build nuclear energy facilities in Saudi Arabia. President Trump later stated the deal is conditional on Saudi Arabia normalising relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords.
Also on 22 July, Yemen’s Houthis claimed they struck two Saudi Arabia-flagged oil tankers in the Red Sea for violating their previously announced blockade.
As of 24 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
Iranian forces conducted attacks against targets in Kuwait every day between 21-24 July. Claimed targets by the IRGC and IRGC-affiliated media included the Ali Al Salem Air Base, Camp Doha, and Camp Buehring. On 23 July, the Al Abdali border crossing with Iraq was struck by an attack drone, which authorities stated resulted in material damage but no casualties. Earlier on 21 July, the Kuwaiti foreign ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador after a Kuwaiti tanker was struck on 20 July along the Strait of Hormuz, injuring several crew members.
On 23 July, the UK’s FCDO upgraded the travel advisory rating for Kuwait to advise against all but essential travel.
As of 24 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
Iranian forces conducted attacks against targets in Bahrain every day between 21-24 July. The IRGC claimed to have targeted the Isa Air Base in southern Bahrain, and IRGC-affiliated media reported that the US Fifth Fleet Headquarters and Israeli embassy in Manama had been targeted. Late 21 July, authorities announced that the body of a man had been found in Hamad Town, but have not confirmed whether this was connected with an Iranian attack conducted earlier that day.
On 23 July, the UK’s FCDO upgraded the travel advisory rating for Bahrain to advise against all but essential travel.
As of 24 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks took place in Qatar between the afternoon of 21 July and 24 July.
As of 24 July, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks took place in the UAE between the afternoon of 21 July and 24 July.
As of 24 July, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 21 and 24 July.
As of 24 July, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The continuation of US strikes against Iran into a thirteenth consecutive night overnight 23–24 July, and President Trump’s 23 July statement that he is considering an attack “larger than ever before”, almost certainly indicates that the Trump administration has not yet assessed the costs of the conflict as too great to continue. These statements likely indicate that Washington is instead signalling an intent to escalate further to compel compliance from Tehran on US terms. The reported increasing expansion of US targeting to areas outside southern Iran almost certainly marks a widening of the strike campaign inside Iran, consistent with this escalatory posture.
This trajectory reflects the earlier US intelligence assessment seen by US officials that reportedly indicates that the intensity of strikes against Iran so far is unlikely to soften Tehran’s negotiation position. IRGC hardliners have almost certainly consolidated significant power within the regime since the conflict began in late February, and while some key political figures in Tehran highly likely continue to advocate for a negotiated solution with the US, many IRGC hardliners highly likely maintain total opposition to any potential concessions.
Unless the Trump administration reverses course and concedes in particular on increased Iranian control of the SoH, with Iran’s lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf having reiterated that the SoH “will not return to its pre-war status”, the conflict is likely to remain in the short term in a higher-intensity phase. This phase is likely to escalate further towards the intensity seen in the pre-8 April ceasefire implementation period. This phase remains characterised by regular US strike packages and subsequent Iranian retaliatory strikes against targets in the Gulf states and Jordan.
President Trump’s 22 July threat to destroy an Iranian bridge or power plant in response to each Iranian attack on a vessel in the SoH, and the subsequent threats of retaliation by senior Iranian politicians, the IRGC, and IRGC-affiliated media which listed specific potential targets (as seen in earlier phases of the conflict), almost certainly marks a further escalation. These threats of tit-for-tat strikes indicate that further Iranian strikes against power and desalination plants (as recently observed against Kuwait), and potentially other energy infrastructure targets, international airports, ports, and bridges, will likely follow any US attacks against Iranian bridges or power plants. The explicit threats against Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari infrastructure are also particularly notable given that Iran has recently prioritised the targeting of Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
The brief activation of air raid sirens in Dammam on 22 July, coinciding with Iranian attacks on nearby Bahrain, may be the second Iranian attack against Saudi Arabia since April, although this remains unconfirmed. The King Abdulaziz Air Base at Dhahran, just south of Dammam, represents a plausible target. The almost certainly greater level of deterrence posed by Riyadh, reinforced by Pakistani deployments under an agreed military alliance, has likely continued to reduce the prioritisation of Saudi Arabia as a target relative to Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, the naming of the Riyadh power plant as a potential target in IRGC-affiliated media, and the approval by President Trump on 22 July of a deal to help build nuclear energy facilities in Saudi Arabia, likely contribute towards a greater risk of Saudi Arabia being targeted by Iranian strikes. Furthermore, any tangible progress towards Saudi–Israeli normalisation, which President Trump has demanded as a condition for the nuclear deal, would almost certainly increase Iran’s incentive to target Saudi Arabia.
The Houthi maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia has now materialised into kinetic activity with the Houthi attacks against two Saudi Arabia-flagged oil tankers. This almost certainly marks a significant escalation of the Saudi–Houthi confrontation and confirms the risk that the declared blockade would translate into attacks on shipping. Houthi attacks on Saudi-linked vessels likely raise the risk of Saudi strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen, which would in turn likely prompt further Houthi attacks against Saudi territory, following the earlier attack on Abha International Airport and Houthi threats against further Saudi airports and other “vital interests on land and sea”. The Houthi threat to the Bab al-Mandab Strait (BaM), alongside the Iranian threat to the SoH, highly likely also serves more broadly to bolster Tehran’s leverage with the simultaneous disruption to two critical maritime chokepoints.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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