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US-Iran Conflict Escalates Across Gulf Civilian Infrastructure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 17 July 2026 – 21 July 2026
- Between 17-21 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted daily waves of strikes against Iran. In retaliation, Iran has conducted attacks against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
- Iranian forces have continued to conduct attacks against power and desalination plants in Kuwait, claimed to have targeted an Amazon data centre in Bahrain, and launched an attack against Aqaba in southern Jordan, in close proximity to Eilat, Israel.
- At least two US military personnel were killed as a result of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ballistic missile and attack drone strikes against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Azraq, Jordan, and one US service member was reported as being killed in northern Iraq. The first such deaths since March, these almost certainly mark an escalation which placed greater pressure on the Trump administration to continue escalating despite ongoing efforts by regional mediators to propose a ten-day ceasefire.
- An attack against Saudi Arabia, the first since April, appears to have been highly limited and likely primarily symbolic. The attack coincides with the escalation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis, and may be an attempt by Tehran to ward off further Saudi action against the Houthis.
- On 20 July, the Houthis announced a maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia, effective immediately. Messages were subsequently broadcast over marine VHF radio warning vessels not to dock at Saudi ports, or they will be treated as targets. The Houthi declaration has not yet materialised into kinetic activity against Saudi-linked vessels as of 21 July. Any such Houthi attacks would likely lead to Saudi strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen, which in turn would likely lead to the launching of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia.
- As of 21 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Numerous flight cancellations have followed the resumption of attacks.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: US-Iran Conflict Enters New High-Intensity Phase
Overnight 17-18 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted its seventh consecutive night of strikes against Iran. In retaliation, Iran launched attacks against targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Moreover, a ballistic missile was launched at a US base in Saudi Arabia, which would be the first Iranian attack against Saudi Arabia in over three months.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ballistic missile and attack drone strikes against Kuwait hit a power and desalination plant, and strikes against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Azraq, Jordan, resulted in the deaths of at least two US service members. Furthermore, another US service member was reported on 18 July as being killed in northern Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from a downed Iranian attack drone.
On 18 July, the social media account of Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued a statement accusing the US of repeatedly violating the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), described US President Donald Trump’s signature as “worthless”, and warned of further escalation from both Iran and its proxies. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, also stated that Iran has suspended the implementation of its MoU commitments.
Overnight 18-19 July, CENTCOM conducted an eighth night of strikes against Iran. CENTCOM stated that in addition to other military targets, the strikes specifically targeted IRGC forces responsible for the attack against Jordan. The Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) stated that the US struck the Darkhovin Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), which is under construction. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared that it was investigating the incident, and that as the facility is in the very early stages of construction with no nuclear material present, an attack would be unlikely to pose a radiological risk.
On 19 July, CENTCOM conducted its ninth consecutive night of strikes, with the IRGC launching retaliation strikes against targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Notably, Iran struck a power and desalination plant in Kuwait for a second consecutive day and launched ballistic missiles at Jordan’s southern port city of Aqaba.
On 20 July, CENTCOM conducted further strikes against Iran, with Iranian state media reporting that two oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) were struck in retaliation, in addition to US military assets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Moreover, the IRGC claimed to have targeted an Amazon data centre in Bahrain as retaliation for the claimed US strikes on Darkhovin NPP. Further Iranian attacks are ongoing as of 21 July.
On 20 July, Yemen’s Houthis announced a maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia, effective immediately. Messages were subsequently broadcast over marine VHF radio warning vessels not to dock at Saudi ports, or they will be treated as targets. The Saudi Foreign Ministry condemned the declaration and rejected Houthi allegations of a “siege of the Yemeni people”. A Saudi coalition spokesperson has stated that its forces will take steps to ensure the safety of commercial ships transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait (BaM).
On 20 July, President Trump stated that he had ordered the Pentagon to make Iran pay “many times over” for each death of an American service member. Earlier on 19 July, US officials briefed that the US had begun deploying additional F-16 and F-35 fighter jets from European bases to the Middle East.
US and Israeli officials briefed that President Trump faces two potential courses of action: the pursuit of a new ten-day ceasefire aimed at reopening the SoH, or launching a major joint military campaign with Israel against Iran. Regional mediators such as Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan, reportedly presented Washington and Tehran with the ten-day ceasefire proposal, with US officials briefing that the Trump administration is reviewing the proposal while urging Israel to avoid steps that could close the diplomatic window.
As of 21 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. However, numerous flight cancellations have followed the resumption of attacks.
On 14 July, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB) which recommended that air operators should: “Not operate within the airspace of Bahrain (Bahrain FIR – OBBB), Kuwait (Kuwait FIR – OKAC), Qatar (Doha FIR – OTDF), the United Arab Emirates (Emirates FIR – OMAE), and the airspace over the waters of the Gulf of Oman within the FIR Muscat (OOMM)”. The notification is valid until 29 July. Following an attempted Houthi attack against Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that closed Abha, Jizan
Saudi Arabia
Early 18 July, early-warning systems were activated in Al-Kharj, southeast of Riyadh (where the Prince Sultan Air Base which hosts US forces is located), and in Yanbu Governorate. This has been attributed to an Iranian attack, which would be the first direct Iranian attack against Saudi Arabia since April.
On 20 July, Yemen’s Houthis announced a maritime blockade on Saudi ports, effective immediately. A Saudi coalition spokesperson has stated that its forces will take steps to ensure the safety of commercial ships.
As of 21 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, following the attempted Houthi attack on Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that closed Abha, Jizan, Najran, and Sharurah airports. The NOTAM has been repeatedly extended and remains in effect.
Kuwait
On 17 July, Kuwaiti authorities declared that Iranian attacks damaged a power and water desalination plant and injured military personnel at bases around the country.
Early 18 July, Kuwaiti air defences reportedly intercepted further Iranian drone attacks. Kuwait Airways stated that most of its flights were rescheduled as operations were temporarily suspended at Kuwait International Airport amid Iranian attacks. A fire broke out after Iranian strikes hit a power and water desalination plant in Kuwait, with the public being urged to conserve energy and reduce consumption during peak-demand periods. Kuwaiti officials stated that multiple firefighters were injured while responding to at least two fires started by Iranian airstrikes at unspecified locations across the country. Two fires were subsequently brought under control.
On 19 July, Kuwaiti air defences responded to further Iranian attacks multiple times throughout the day. Kuwaiti authorities stated that an Iranian strike caused a fire at a desalination plant for the second time in two days, with emergency crews on scene conducting damage assessment and repair.
On 20 July, air defences were activated multiple times, and Kuwait’s military stated that air defences were responding to an Iranian missile and drone attack. The IRGC stated that it struck a US early warning radar system, equipment shed, and Reaper drone hangar in earlier strikes. IRGC-affiliated media also stated that the military struck a US HIMARS system at Camp Arifjan in southern Kuwait, as well as US radars and missile defence systems at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait’s Al Ahmadi region. In total, the IRGC claimed to have struck three bases hosting US forces in Kuwait in the latest wave of strikes.
As of 21 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Kuwait’s airspace.
Bahrain
On 18, 19, and 20 July, air raid sirens reactivated in Bahrain, and air defences activated. Bahrain’s military stated it intercepted and destroyed several Iranian attacks on 20 July. Bahrain’s government stated that Iran attacked civil aviation navigation systems with attack drones but operations were unaffected. The IRGC stated that it targeted Bahrain’s Sakhir Air Base and Salman Port.
On 21 July, Iran’s military claimed to have destroyed US radar and air defence systems in Muharraq and Riffa in Bahrain. Bahraini officials stated that air defence systems countered multiple Iranian attacks, but provided no further details.
As of 21 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Bahrain’s airspace.
Qatar
No attacks took place in Qatar between the afternoon of 17 July and 21 July.
As of 21 July, Qatar’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Qatar’s airspace.
UAE
No attacks took place in the UAE between the afternoon of 17 July and 21 July.
As of 21 July, the UAE’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in the UAE’s airspace.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 17 and 21 July.
As of 21 July, Oman’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in the Gulf of Oman in Oman’s airspace.
Regional Advisory
The killing of US service members, the first such deaths since March, almost certainly marks an escalation which placed greater pressure on the Trump administration to continue escalating despite ongoing efforts by regional mediators to propose a ten-day ceasefire. The reported further deployment of US military aircraft to the region highly likely indicates that US CENTCOM is shaping the conditions for a potential further escalation in military operations against Iran.
A US intelligence assessment seen by US officials reportedly indicates that the current intensity of strikes against Iran is unlikely to soften Tehran’s negotiation position. IRGC hardliners have almost certainly consolidated significant power within the regime since the conflict began in late February, and while some key political figures in Tehran highly likely continue to advocate for a negotiated solution with the US, many IRGC hardliners highly likely maintain total opposition to any potential concessions.
Unless the Trump administration calculates that the costs of the conflict are becoming too great to continue and therefore concedes on allowing increased Iranian control of the SoH, the conflict is likely to remain in the short term in a higher-intensity phase. Characterised by regular US strike packages and subsequent Iranian retaliatory strikes against targets in the Gulf states and Jordan, this phase was initially less intense than the pre-8 April ceasefire implementation period. However, the US strikes on Iranian infrastructure and the subsequent Iranian strikes on Kuwaiti electricity generation and desalination plants almost certainly mark an escalation approaching levels seen in earlier phases of the conflict.
During these earlier phases, Iran conducted strikes against energy infrastructure, airports, and other civilian infrastructure across the region in response to US attacks on analogous targets inside Iran. This pattern of calibrated, reciprocal targeting is likely continuing, as reflected by the IRGC announcement of targeting an Amazon data centre in Bahrain in retaliation for alleged strikes against an Iranian NPP.
The continued US targeting of bridges, railway and airport infrastructure, and, if confirmed, power infrastructure, has expanded US targeting from military and maritime capabilities to civilian and dual-use infrastructure. Given Iran’s targeting of Kuwaiti electricity generation and desalination plants, it is likely that further strikes against civilian infrastructure in the Gulf states will take place. This may include energy infrastructure, further desalination and power plants, international airports and ports, and bridges, with the King Fahd Causeway between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain likely representing a high-profile and high-impact target for Iran.
Iran’s targeting has expanded geographically since 17 July. First, the attempted strikes against southern Jordan in Aqaba are likely calibrated to mark a further escalation in Iranian retaliation. Aqaba is in close proximity to the Israeli city of Eilat, and Israeli air defences were activated in response to the Aqaba attack. If sustained, such attacks likely raise the risk of renewed Israeli involvement in the conflict, with Israeli leaders having warned of a full-force response to any direct Iranian attack.
Second, an attack against targets in Saudi Arabia is the first since April, with the almost certainly greater level of deterrence posed by Riyadh (reinforced by Pakistani deployments to Saudi Arabia under an agreed military alliance) and continued diplomatic efforts having likely reduced the prioritisation of Saudi Arabia as a target. The attempted attack appears limited in scale from initial reports, which suggests it was likely primarily symbolic. The attack also coincides with the Houthi escalation and may be an attempt by Tehran to ward off further Saudi action against the Houthis.
The Houthi declaration of a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia is ostensibly primarily aimed at pressuring Riyadh to lift its blockade of Houthi-controlled Yemen enforced since 2015. However, the declaration likely also serves to bolster Iran’s leverage in the broader conflict due to the threat to the global economy posed by a potential closure of the BaM in addition to the SoH. The Houthi declaration has not yet materialised into kinetic activity against Saudi-linked vessels as of 21 July. Any such Houthi attacks would likely lead to Saudi strikes against Houthi-controlled Yemen, which in turn would likely lead to the launching of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia. During this recent period of significant Saudi-Houthi tensions, the Houthis have launched an attack against Abha International Airport and threatened specifically to launch attacks against further Saudi airports and other “vital interests on land and sea”.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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