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US-Iran Conflict Escalates Across Gulf Civilian Infrastructure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 14 July 2026 – 17 July 2026
- Overnight 14-15 July, CENTCOM conducted a seven-hour wave of strikes against dozens of military targets in Iran. On 15 July, the IRGC conducted retaliatory strikes against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan. The US conducted further waves of strikes on 15-17 July, with further Iranian retaliation salvos being launched at targets in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar.
- US President Trump threatened on 14 July that strikes would be conducted against Iran’s bridges and power plants next week “unless they get to the table and negotiate.” Overnight 16-17 July, the US struck seven bridges and railway, port, and airport infrastructure. Iran has also accused the US of targeting “power infrastructure”, although this remains unconfirmed.
- On 17 July, Kuwait’s Ministry of Electricity, Water and Renewable Energy stated that one of its electricity generation and water desalination plants was targeted by Iran in the latest attack, resulting in fire and damage to the site. Further attacks against civilian infrastructure is highly likely.
- Reports emerged on 14 July that an Iranian missile targeting Bahrain during the overnight 13-14 July attack may have used a cluster munition warhead. While this remains unconfirmed, if repeated, it would almost certainly increase the risk of collateral damage from Iranian strikes.
- Following an attempted Houthi attack against Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) which closed Abha, Jizan and Najran airports until 18:00 local time, 14 July. The NOTAM has been extended to 15:00 UTC, 17 July.
- As of 17 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. However, on 14 July, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB) which recommended that air operators should not operate within the airspace of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and over the waters of the Gulf of Oman within Omani airspace. The notification is valid until 29 July.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: US-Iran Conflict Enters New High-Intensity Phase
Reports emerged on 14 July that an Iranian missile targeting Bahrain during the overnight 13-14 July attack may have used a cluster munition warhead. The exact target remains unconfirmed but has been reported as US military facilities in Bahrain.
US President Donald Trump held a Situation Room meeting on 14 July, reportedly discussing a potential significant further escalation of US strikes against Iran. In an interview with US media, President Trump threatened that strikes would be conducted against Iran’s bridges and power plants next week “unless they get to the table and negotiate.”
Overnight 14-15 July, CENTCOM conducted a seven-hour wave of strikes against dozens of military targets near the SoH and along Iran’s coast, with Iranian media reporting explosions in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Hengam, Sirik and Bushehr. On 15 July, the IRGC conducted retaliatory strikes against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan. The US conducted further waves of strikes on 15-17 July, marking a sixth consecutive day of operations, with further Iranian retaliation salvos being launched at targets in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar.
Overnight 16-17 July, IRGC-affiliated media reported that US strikes targeted several Iranian bridges, including the Gariveh and Kahurestan bridges, which are key to Iran’s internal logistics and military mobility. US strikes also reportedly targeted Bandar Abbas railway, which connects Iran’s largest port to central Iran; a marine traffic control tower on the Chabahar port; and Iranshahr airport. Iran has also accused the US of targeting “power infrastructure”, although this remains unconfirmed.
Iran responded with further strikes, including on Kuwait’s electricity generation and desalination plants.
On 16 July, senior Iranian figures reportedly stated that Iran requested that the Houthis prepare to attack Red Sea shipping if the US expands its airstrikes to Iranian energy infrastructure.
As of 17 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
However, on 14 July, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB) which recommended that air operators should: “Not operate within the airspace of Bahrain (Bahrain FIR – OBBB), Kuwait (Kuwait FIR – OKAC), Qatar (Doha FIR – OTDF), the United Arab Emirates (Emirates FIR – OMAE), and the airspace over the waters of the Gulf of Oman within the FIR Muscat (OOMM)”. The notification is valid until 29 July.
Following an attempted Houthi attack against Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) which closed Abha, Jizan and Najran airports until 18:00 local time, 14 July. The NOTAM has been extended to 15:00 UTC, 17 July.
Saudi Arabia
No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 14 and 17 July.
At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 17 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, following the attempted Houthi attack on Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that closed Abha, Jizan, and Najran airports until 18:00 local time on 14 July. The NOTAM has been extended to 15:00 UTC, 17 July.
Kuwait
On 14 July, Kuwaiti authorities stated air defence systems were engaging hostile aerial targets. Later in the evening, Kuwait’s defence ministry stated that it had intercepted one ballistic missile, five cruise missiles, and 33 attack drones. The IRGC claimed that its attacks destroyed drones at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait. Iranian attacks on a naval vessel also reportedly injured four members of Kuwait’s armed forces.
Further attack drones were intercepted early 15 July, and IRGC-linked media shared unverified footage of an attack drone striking a target in Kuwait. A separate post claimed that the IRGC targeted the KJL logistics warehouse near Mina Abd Allah, as well as US air defences and a satellite communication centre. Kuwaiti media reported no injuries but material damage to vital infrastructure after the interception of four Iranian missiles and 21 drones since dawn. Further reports of air defences responding to an Iranian attack were reported later in the evening. Separately, Kuwaiti state media reported an unspecified security operation underway in the Jeleeb al-Shoyoukh area of Kuwait City.
Early 16 July, the IRGC claimed to have struck an early warning radar for a US C-RAM system at Ali Al Salem Air Base. Later in the day, the Kuwaiti military stated that air defence systems were intercepting Iranian attack drones, adding that the drone strikes damaged residential areas but there were no immediate injuries reported.
Early on 17 July, air raid sirens were activated again, and the IRGC claimed to have attacked a US military base in Kuwait. Kuwait’s Ministry of Electricity, Water and Renewable Energy stated that one of its electricity generation and water desalination plants was targeted by Iran in the latest attack, resulting in fire and damage to the site. Officials later confirmed that the fire had been brought under control.
At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 17 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Kuwait’s airspace.
Bahrain
On 14 July, unverified reports emerged that Iran used a cluster munition warhead in an attack on Bahrain for the first time. Air raid sirens were activated in Bahrain in the evening, and the IRGC claimed its missile and drone strikes destroyed “weapons storage facilities and parts for enemy ships and aircraft” at Isa Air Base.
Early 15 July, Iranian state media claimed that its military struck US sites in Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, southeast Manama, damaging warehouses and fuel tanks. Bahrain’s defence ministry stated that its air defences intercepted and destroyed several projectiles launched by Iran. Air raid sirens were activated again in the evening.
On 16 July, the IRGC stated that it attacked US military assets in southern Bahrain, in response to the US allegedly using bases in Bahrain in the latest wave of attacks on Iran.
On 17 July, air raid sirens were activated again. Iranian media claimed that Iranian attacks struck US military aircraft, including helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft, at Sakhir Airbase. Unverified social media footage showed smoke rising from an undetermined location in a desert, with claims that it was caused by a fire at Bahrain’s Bapco oil refinery following an Iranian strike.
At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 17 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Bahrain’s airspace.
Qatar
No attacks were reported in Qatar between 14 and 16 July. Early 17 July, Qatar’s Interior Ministry issued a warning to the public, urging them to take shelter, before announcing that it intercepted a missile attack from Iran. Falling shrapnel from an Iranian attack reportedly injured one child. Iran later claimed an attack on the US air base in Al Udeid, claiming to have destroyed a long-range radar system and several US strategic refuelling aircraft.
At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 17 July, Qatar’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Qatar’s airspace.
UAE
Late 16 July, explosions were reported in central Dubai following unverified reports that UAE-made attack drones had struck Iran’s Port of Bandar Abbas. However, Emirati authorities denied reports of an explosion.
At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 17 July, the UAE’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in the UAE’s airspace.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 14 and 17 July.
At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 17 July, Oman’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in the Gulf of Oman in Oman’s airspace.
Regional Advisory
The MoU has almost certainly ceased to function as a de-escalation framework, and Iranian lawmakers stated on 14 July formally ending Iran’s participation in the agreement. The reimposition of the US naval blockade and the earlier revocation of the Iranian oil-sales waiver have effectively removed the principal incentives provided to Tehran under the MoU. The IRGC’s formal declaration of the SoH’s closure on 11 July, sustained attacks on commercial vessels attempting to transit the SoH outside of Iran’s approved corridor, and expanded attacks against targets across the region almost certainly indicate that Tehran no longer considers itself bound by the provisions of the MoU.
The conflict has likely now entered a new, higher-intensity phase characterised by regular US strike packages and subsequent Iranian retaliatory strikes against targets in the Gulf states and Jordan. While this phase was initially less intense than the pre-8 April ceasefire implementation period, the US strikes on Iranian bridges and the subsequent Iranian strikes on Kuwaiti electricity generation and desalination plants almost certainly mark an escalation approaching similar levels seen in earlier phases of the conflict.
During these earlier phases, Iran conducted strikes against energy infrastructure, airports, and other civilian infrastructure across the region in response to US attacks on analogous targets inside Iran. This pattern of calibrated, reciprocal targeting is likely to resume following the escalation.
The US targeting of bridges, railway and airport infrastructure, and, if confirmed, power infrastructure, has expanded US targeting from military and maritime capabilities to civilian and dual-use infrastructure. Given Iran’s targeting of Kuwaiti electricity generation and desalination plants, it is likely that further strikes against civilian infrastructure in the Gulf states will take place. This may include energy infrastructure, further desalination and power plants, international airports and ports, and bridges, with the King Fahd Causeway between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain likely representing a high-profile and high-impact target for Iran.
Despite Iran’s allegations that the US targeted its power infrastructure, it remains unclear whether the Houthis will act on Tehran’s threats to target Red Sea shipping transiting the BaM. Despite numerous threats to do so, the Houthis have not yet attempted to close the BaM to shipping. On 16 July, Houthi Supreme Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi noted that the Houthis are continuing to prevent Israeli vessels from transiting the BaM strait and Gulf of Aden, but did not refer to expanding the campaign to close the strait to all commercial shipping. Any such attempt to close the strait would highly likely trigger direct US strikes against Houthi forces, and potentially escalate tensions between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
The reported use of Iranian cluster munitions against Bahrain remains unconfirmed. However, if accurate, this would almost certainly mark an escalation in Iranian attacks against targets in the Gulf states, with cluster munitions only previously being used by Iran against Israel. If repeated, it would almost certainly increase the risks of collateral damage. The Israeli military assessed that approximately half of all Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Israel during the current war were equipped with cluster warheads and were responsible for many civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. Iranian cluster warheads release dozens of submunitions at high altitude, dispersing them over a radius of several kilometres. The use of cluster munitions over a densely populated island like Bahrain would almost certainly increase the risk of civilian casualties, in addition to leaving large quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).
The potential involvement of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in previous attacks on Kuwait’s northern border posts likely indicates that Tehran is willing to activate proxy forces to broaden the scope of retaliation and threaten further escalation.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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