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Strait of Hormuz Tensions Keep Gulf Security Risks Elevated
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 30 June 2026 – 3 July 2026
- US and Iranian officials held indirect talks in Doha on 30 June and 1 July. Officials reported that the talks were focused solely on the technical issues of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and the unfreezing of Iranian funds.
- Qatar’s Foreign Ministry stated that the next meetings are scheduled to take place after the funeral processions for Iran’s now deceased former Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is scheduled to be buried on 9 July.
- Iranian channels have continued to claim sovereignty over the SoH, and have threatened to resume strikes on vessels that do not abide by Iranian instructions.
- US media reported on 1 July that US President Donald Trump had considered the possibility of carrying out a new wave of strikes on Iran, but eventually decided against it.
- Israeli and Hezbollah forces have continued to engage in clashes in southern Lebanon. Ongoing conflict in Lebanon is likely to be a key trigger for destabilising the broader ceasefire.
- There remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement. These cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to strikes against regional countries, with targets in Bahrain and Kuwait being more recently prioritised by Iran.
- As of 3 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Gulf States Remain Vulnerable to Renewed Retaliatory Strikes
Following the announcement of a renewed truce on 28 June, US and Iranian officials held indirect talks in Doha, Qatar, on 30 June and 1 July. Mediated by Pakistani and Qatari officials, the indirect talks were reportedly focused solely on technical issues related to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and the unfreezing of Iranian funds. Qatar’s Foreign Ministry has stated that the next meetings are scheduled to take place after the funeral processions for Iran’s now deceased former Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is scheduled to be buried on 9 July.
Iran’s chief negotiator and parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, gave an interview on 30 June in which he said that Iran will not enter further negotiations until conditions in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) are met, notably an end to conflict in Lebanon and the unfreezing of Iranian assets. Furthermore, Ghalibaf reiterated that Iran has sovereignty over the SoH with Oman and that fee-free transit through the SoH will be in place for only 60 days, as per the MoU. Ghalibaf stated that if “the dialogue is not implemented, we are also prepared for war”.
On 30 June, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that he had instructed the IDF to prepare plans for an independent strike against Iran, and that Israel would be ready to go to war “tomorrow”. This was echoed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who stated that Israel would strike Iran to counter the “existential threat” posed by its nuclear programme. Netanyahu also reiterated that Israeli forces would remain in Lebanon as long as Hezbollah constitutes a threat.
On 1 July, a US Navy MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter conducted an emergency landing in the Arabian Sea. US officials stated that “[t]here is no indication the emergency was caused by hostile action.” Three of the helicopter’s four-man crew were recovered, while one is missing as of 3 July.
On 2 July, official channels of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the country’s top operational military headquarters, stated that Iran would respond to any attempt by the US to challenge its control over the SoH, likely indicating its willingness to strike more vessels in the waterway.
On 3 July, US President Donald Trump stated that Iran had “agreed to just about everything” the US demanded during negotiations. On 1 July, US media had reported that the White House had considered options for a return to war but ultimately decided to focus on diplomatic efforts.
As of 3 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Saudi Arabia
No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 30 June and 3 July.
At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 3 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 30 June and 3 July.
At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 3 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 30 June and 3 July.
At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 3 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 30 June and 3 July.
Qatar hosted the latest round of indirect US-Iran talks on 30 June and 1 July. Qatari officials reported “progress” in the talks and stated that the next round will occur after 9 July.
At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 3 July, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 30 June and 3 July.
At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 3 July, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
No attacks have been reported in Oman between 30 June and 3 July.
At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 3 July, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
As exemplified by the 30 June interview given by Ghalibaf, the Iranian regime has consistently reiterated that it will maintain longer-term control over the SoH despite the MoU. The military headquarters’ statement further demonstrates Iran’s willingness to use force against vessels for perceived violations of its established “sovereignty” over the strait.
Almost certainly a long-term objective for the regime, greater control over the SoH not only gives the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees but also bolsters deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having been a critical source of leverage. However, it is unlikely that continued Iranian control will be acceptable to the US and the international community. Further Iranian attempts to forcefully exert its stated control of the SoH, such as the two attacks against merchant vessels which did not abide by Iranian conditions and were followed by US strikes, will likely lead to further confrontation.
In addition to endangering the broader MoU, cycles of escalation from the maritime domain since the implementation of the first ceasefire on 8 April have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against regional countries, first with the UAE and more recently against Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. During the 26-28 June escalation, Bahrain and Kuwait were targeted, in a likely continuation of this recently observed target prioritisation. However, these attempted strikes on US forces in the Gulf were also likely calibrated to be sub-threshold and were limited in salvo size, largely intercepted by US and allied air defences, and aimed at signalling capability and intent without provoking a wider US response.
Currently, Iranian retaliation strikes are less likely to directly target Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Oman, although direct strikes against these countries cannot be ruled out in the event of a significant escalation and/or breakdown in the MoU. Senior Iranian officials and the IRGC have repeatedly threatened that strikes will be conducted against US military assets across the region in response to continued “aggression”.
Ghalibaf’s 30 June interview was likely part of an effort to assuage the concerns of IRGC hardliners, who have consistently advocated against negotiations with the US. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government and negotiating team. Agreements made in the diplomatic track are almost certainly vulnerable to spoiling by more hardline elements in the regime, which have indicated opposition to even minor perceived concessions to the US.
Continued IDF operations in Lebanon are likely to pose a significant threat to the MoU and have previously resulted in Iranian military claims of closing the SoH during the post-MoU period. While Iranian attacks against Israel are unlikely if operations are limited and contained to southern Lebanon, IDF strikes on Beirut could trigger a direct Iranian response against Israel. This, in turn, would likely lead to an escalation cycle with high risks of a broader ceasefire collapse. Opposition to the MoU from senior Israeli politicians almost certainly reflects concerns that the agreement does not satisfy Israel’s key objectives, with Iran’s ballistic missile programme and support for proxy forces omitted from negotiations. Israeli opposition and/or unilateral military action are likely to complicate the MoU’s implementation and undermine the agreement.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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