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Strait of Hormuz Attacks and Houthi-Saudi Tensions Raise Escalation Risk
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 30 June 2026 – 07 July 2026
- Overnight 6-7 July, at least two vessels were attacked in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). These attacks have taken place just over a week after the US and Iran agreed to halt tit-for-tat strikes that were exchanged 26-28 June, which also followed attacks against vessels in the SoH.
- There is a realistic possibility of a similar cycle of escalation occurring in the coming days, with limited US strikes against Iranian territory highly likely to be followed by limited Iranian strikes targeting US regional bases, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain, given recently established target prioritisation.
- On 3 July, a spokesman for Yemen’s Houthis announced that Saudi Arabian “warplanes” had been confronted by Houthi air defence, and that repeated airspace violations would be retaliated against with strikes on Saudi Arabia’s airports and other “vital interests”. A spokesman for the Saudi Arabia-led coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG) issued threats in response.
- The exchange of threats marks what is likely the most significant escalation in rhetoric between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia in years, and was followed by clashes between Houthi and Yemeni IRG forces. While the risk of a full resumption of the Yemeni civil war and a return to full-scale conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia is unlikely in the immediate term, the risk has risen significantly in the last few days.
- As of 7 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Iran Funeral Period Pauses US Talks as Strait of Hormuz Vessel Attacks Raise Regional Risk
The funeral of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the early stages of the conflict, began on 4 July and is set to conclude on 9 July, with ceremonies hosted in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad. Qatar’s foreign ministry had earlier said that US-Iran negotiations will be paused during the funeral and will resume after 9 July. International media reported that as many as 12 million people have attended the processions, with some mourners recorded chanting “death to the compromiser” in reference to President Masoud Pezeshkian for engaging in negotiations with the US.
Overnight 6-7 July, the UK Maritime Trade Operations stated that a tanker had been hit by an “unknown projectile” close to the coast of Oman. The tanker was later identified as the Marshall Islands-flagged Qatari LNG tanker AL REKAYYAT (IMO: 9397339). Further reports indicate that another vessel, the Saudi Arabia-flagged crude oil tanker WEDYAN (IMO:9524970), was also struck overnight. US officials have briefed that Iran’s military fired at least two missiles at commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), and that both vessels suffered significant damage but no casualties.
As of 7 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Jordan
No attacks have been reported in Jordan between 3 and 7 July.
At least 29 people have been injured in Jordan, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 7 July, Jordan’s airspace is open.
Saudi Arabia
No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 3 and 7 July.
On 3 July, the Houthis’ military spokesman, Yahya Saree, announced that Houthi forces had confronted Saudi Arabian “warplanes” that allegedly attempted to prevent an Iranian civilian aircraft from landing at Sanaa International Airport in Houthi-controlled Yemen. The Houthi spokesman threatened that any allegedly repeated airspace violations would be retaliated against with strikes on Saudi Arabian airports and other “vital interests on land and sea”.
On 4 July, the spokesman of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG), Major-General Turki al-Maliki, pledged a response of “unprecedented determination and force” to any attempts to target Saudi Arabia or violate Yemeni sovereignty, dismissed the Houthi threats, and noted that the group’s posture had exposed civilian infrastructure in Houthi-controlled Yemen to potential targeting.
On 4-5 July, clashes between the Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces were reported south of Hodeidah, likely marking the most serious fighting between the two sides since 2024. On 5 July, a bulk carrier transiting the Red Sea reported being attacked by unknown armed assailants on a skiff, around 13 nm off the Yemen coast near Al-Durayhimi, a Houthi-controlled area. If confirmed as the Houthis, this would mark a further escalation, with the Houthis having suspended attacks against merchant vessels in recent months.
At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 7 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 3 and 7 July.
At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 7 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 3 and 7 July.
At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 7 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 3 and 7 July.
In response to the attack against the Qatari LNG tanker in the SoH overnight 6-7 July, Qatar’s foreign ministry stated that Tehran bore full legal responsibility for the attack. Qatar has been acting as a mediator, alongside Pakistan, between the US and Iran, with no Iranian attacks recorded against Qatar since the implementation of a ceasefire on 8 April.
At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 7 July, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 3 and 7 July.
At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 7 July, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 3 and 7 July.
At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 7 July, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The attacks against commercial vessels transiting the SoH have taken place just over a week after the US and Iran agreed to suspend tit-for-tat strikes that were exchanged 26-28 June. The agreement followed a cycle of military escalation in the SoH, beginning with Iranian attacks on commercial shipping, followed by US Central Command (CENTCOM) strikes against Iranian military infrastructure and subsequent Iranian retaliatory strikes on US military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed to have targeted the Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain in these strikes, which were likely calibrated to remain sub-threshold while signalling capability.
In addition to threatening the broader MoU, cycles of escalation originating in the maritime domain since the implementation of the first ceasefire on 8 April have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against terrestrial targets in the Gulf and Jordan. This pattern was first observed with Iranian attacks on the UAE and more recently against Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. During the 26-28 June escalation, Iranian retaliation was limited to Bahrain and Kuwait, likely reflecting this emerging pattern of target prioritisation. There is a realistic possibility of a similar cycle of escalation occurring in the coming days, characterised by limited US strikes against Iranian military targets followed by limited Iranian strikes targeting US regional bases, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain, if recently established target prioritisation is sustained.
Currently, Iranian retaliation strikes are less likely to directly target Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Oman, although direct strikes against these countries cannot be ruled out in the event of a significant escalation and/or breakdown in the MoU. Senior Iranian officials and the IRGC have repeatedly threatened that strikes will be conducted against US military assets across the region in response to continued “aggression”.
Iran has avoided directly targeting Saudi Arabia and Qatar since the implementation of a ceasefire 8 April. Saudi Arabia highly likely exerts the greatest level of deterrence against Iran and has maintained regular diplomatic communication with Tehran, while Qatar is currently actively serving as a mediator in the US-Iran talks. However, it is notable that the vessels attacked by Iran in the SoH were Saudi Arabia and Qatar-owned. The vessels were reportedly transiting with AIS turned off and were conducting an outbound transit of the SoH via the Omani route and not Iran’s approved transit corridor. According to Iranian state television, the AL REKAYYAT had also reportedly ignored IRGC warnings. It currently remains unclear if the vessels were targeted due to their ownership links to Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The attacks likely indicate that the IRGC is prioritising Iranian control of the SoH and assesses that limited attacks on shipping will not trigger a major escalation.
The MoU almost certainly remains fragile and is functioning primarily as an extension of the 8 April ceasefire, rather than as a substantive or durable peace agreement. The previous ceasefire was marked by sporadic exchanges of strikes between the US and Iran following continued confrontations in the maritime domain. There remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement.
Iranian adherence to the ceasefire is likely to be undermined by the IRGC, which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The funeral procession for Iran’s former Supreme Leader is ongoing, with the sentiments of anti-negotiation hardliners likely empowered by the proceedings. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government and negotiating team.
The recent exchange of threats between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis likely represents the most significant escalation in rhetoric between the two sides in years, ending a period of relative calm that persisted despite the wider regional conflict involving Iran, the Houthis’ primary sponsor. While the risk of a full resumption of the Yemeni civil war and a return to full-scale conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia is unlikely in the immediate term, the risk has likely increased significantly in the last few days. There is a realistic possibility of further clashes in Yemen and further exchanges of hostile rhetoric between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in the coming days, and miscalculation threatens to undermine the ceasefire in place since 2022.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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