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18 – 25 June

Global Intelligence Summary

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Geopolitical, Global Security & Environmental Events

Mark Overington
Mark Overington
Head of Intelligence
Joshua George
Joshua George
Intelligence Analyst
Julian Kett
Julian Kett
Intelligence Analyst
Manfredi Pozzoli
Manfredi Pozzoli
Intelligence Analyst

Key Events This Week

America

AMER

Colombia

The victory of a populist right-wing candidate in the Colombian presidential election will highly likely represent the end of “Total Peace” and result in a more confrontational stance towards Colombia’s armed groups.

AMER

Venezuela

The death toll following high magnitude earthquakes in Venezuela near Caracas is almost certain to rise considerably. The economic impact will highly likely be severe, with a realistic possibility of triggering unrest.

AMER

Bolivia

The declaration of a state of emergency in Bolivia is likely to reduce protests; however, if the government fails to commit to protester demands, further protests are likely after the agreed 90-day implementation window.

AMER

Cuba

The major economic reforms announced by the Cuban government were almost certainly the result of the country’s severe economic crisis and Washington’s demands for political change.


Europe, Middle East and Africa

EMEA

Europe

A heatwave in Europe has caused significant disruptions and dozens of deaths, but conditions are likely to improve starting on 25 June. Heatwave effects are almost certainly worsened by Europe’s ageing infrastructure.

EMEA

Ukraine

Russia’s current advances into the city of Kostyantynivka, Ukraine, are likely limited to small-group infiltrations, but the city’s capture would likely shape conditions for future offensives against Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

EMEA

Middle East

The agreement between the US and Iran has been quickly challenged by continued conflict in Lebanon. The Lebanon track highly likely constitutes the most immediate threat to the deal’s durability over the coming days.

EMEA

Africa

The endorsement by 18 Sub-Saharan African countries of the African Charter on Family, Sovereignty, and Values highly likely threatens the legal rights of LGBTQ+ individuals and advocacy groups operating in those countries.

EMEA

Niger

Further high-profile attacks in Niger are highly likely amid intensified competition between Islamist groups, following the second attack on Niamey airport in fewer than six months.

EMEA

Kenya

There is a realistic possibility that the unrest on the second anniversary of the 2024 Kenyan anti-Finance Bill protests will develop into a nationwide movement. Protests are highly likely to turn violent in Nairobi.


Asia Pacific

APAC

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Afghanistan’s use of drones in Pakistan is likely to proliferate and result in increased cross-border escalation.


On 18 June, Cuban lawmakers adopted a large economic reform package, comprising 176 measures, that are aimed at boosting the private sector, encouraging foreign investment, and reducing the state’s control over several industries. The reforms were approved amidst a protracted economic crisis that was caused by the end of fuel shipments from Venezuela and Mexico, following the US capture of Venezuelan President and key ally of Cuba, Nicolás Maduro, in January 2026.

The measures approved by the Cuban parliament include the removal of size limits on private companies (enterprises of up to 100 people, known as Mipymes, had been allowed since 2021), and the end of foreign investors’ obligations to form joint ventures with the state. Foreign investors will also be allowed to acquire state company shares, and some state-owned enterprises will be restructured as commercial companies. The reforms also allow members of the Cuban diaspora to buy and develop state-owned property. Cubans will also be allowed to open bank accounts in foreign currencies, and private companies, rather than the state, will be allowed to process remittances.

Solace Global Assessment: 

If implemented, the reform package would almost certainly constitute the most significant reforms undertaken by the Cuban state since the 1959 revolution and the subsequent transition of the island nation into a communist state. It is highly likely that the reforms, which were unanimously approved by the Communist Party of Cuba’s (PCC) lawmakers, are a response to the severe pressures imposed on Havana by the US government and to the significant worsening of Cuba’s economic and political situation. The protracted fuel shortage, which has led to a rapid deterioration of Cuba’s energy infrastructure, large parts of the island currently record 24-hour-long blackouts, with public services like transport, healthcare and waste removal having largely suspended operations. Foreign visitors to Cuba have also dropped by an estimated 60 per cent, significantly reducing foreign-currency inflows and further constraining the government’s access to hard currency.

The US has continued to adopt a largely coercive approach towards Cuba, using a combination of threats of military intervention and offers of humanitarian aid conditional on Havana’s acceptance of major structural reforms. The US will likely maintain maximum pressure on Cuba despite the government’s announcement, likely aiming to extract further concessions, including a short timeline for the reform package’s implementation. This is likely reflected by the US State Department’s issuing of a new wave of sanctions targeting the Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), a state conglomerate run by the Cuban armed forces, despite the Cuban government’s approval of the reform package.

In the short term, it is unlikely that the reforms will impact the threats faced by travellers visiting Cuba. All travel to Cuba will almost certainly continue to be impacted by extremely limited healthcare access, lack of adequate housing and transport infrastructure, electricity blackouts, and an increase in property crime caused by the current crisis.


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