Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

The announcement of the MoU’s agreement is almost certainly the biggest diplomatic breakthrough since the implementation of the 8 April two-week ceasefire. With its signing, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict has likely decreased. However, the MoU is likely to function primarily as an extension of the ceasefire, rather than as a substantive or durable peace agreement. The agreement is likely vulnerable to multiple friction points, including conflict in Lebanon, disagreements over the nuclear file, and issues regarding the Strait of Hormuz.

While the US has allowed Iranian tankers to bypass its naval forces, the US’s regional force posture remains largely unchanged, with two carrier strike groups (CSGs) within the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), combined with multiple surface platforms and dozens of additional combat aircraft forward-deployed to regional bases. A US force withdrawal or reduction is likely to be a clearer indication of de-escalation. It is likely to be tied to tangible progress on unresolved issues, principally the nuclear file. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, renewed escalation could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

If the MoU collapses, there is a realistic possibility of renewed Iranian strikes against targets in Jordan and the Gulf States. If recent Iranian targeting patterns are sustained, Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain are likely to be more exposed in the event of a ceasefire breakdown.

Lebanon

The MoU reportedly includes an end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, which is likely to be the immediate test for the agreement. Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, has stated that the IDF will indefinitely remain in the security zone in Lebanon, with IDF operations in southern Lebanon continuing as recently as 19 June. Moreover, senior Israeli officials and politicians have largely reacted negatively to the MoU’s announcement, with Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir stating that Israel is not bound to the deal “in any way”.

Israeli opposition to the MoU almost certainly reflects concerns that the agreement does not satisfy Israel’s key objectives, with Iran’s ballistic missile programme omitted from negotiations. Israeli opposition or unilateral military action is likely to complicate the MoU’s implementation or undermine the agreement at a later stage. Furthermore, Hezbollah is likely to sustain attacks against the IDF and northern Israel in response to continued IDF operations in Lebanon, with senior Hezbollah leadership stating that its position would be linked to Israel’s adherence to a ceasefire.

Tehran is likely to continue leveraging the threat of force in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon to both support Hezbollah and extract concessions from the US during the negotiation phase. The postponement of the formal signing ceremony on 19 June almost certainly increases pressure on the US to push for a halt to Israeli attacks in Lebanon.

The Nuclear File

The primary issue that impeded progress in the Oman-mediated US-Iran talks, which preceded the outbreak of conflict on 28 February, was the nuclear file. The MoU reportedly only involves a reiteration of Iran’s past commitment to never acquire or procure a nuclear weapon, with technical talks on the nuclear file deferred to a post-MoU 60-day negotiation window.

The most difficult issues to resolve will almost certainly be Iran’s buried stockpile of approximately 440.9kg of 60 per cent highly enriched uranium (HEU), enough to produce approximately ten nuclear weapons if enriched further, and whether Iran will be permitted to retain any domestic enrichment capability. There is no credible civilian requirement for uranium enriched to that level, and Iran’s possession of HEU has served as Tehran’s primary source of leverage, which hardliners within the regime are likely to be reluctant to surrender.

The Trump administration’s pre-war position was that Iran suspend all enrichment and physically surrender the HEU stockpile to the US, with Tehran consistently stating that the HEU must remain in Iran. However, Washington’s position has reportedly softened on both fronts. Reports indicate that Washington may be willing to accept Iran domestically down-blending the HEU under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as accepting limited low-level domestic enrichment.

While the specifics of the MoU remain undisclosed, senior US officials and leaders (including Vice President JD Vance) have stated that key incentives such as sanctions relief, regional investment funds, and access to frozen assets will be tied to the resolution of the nuclear file in the 60-day window. There is a realistic possibility that these incentives, in combination with the observed softening of the US position on nuclear demands, could lead to a nuclear agreement. However, recent CIA assessments have raised “serious doubts about Iran’s willingness” to make desired nuclear concessions.

The Strait of Hormuz

The future status of the Strait of Hormuz is also likely to be a major source of friction. While the MoU reportedly provides for the toll-free reopening of the Strait and aims towards a gradual return to pre-war shipping volumes, issues regarding the Strait’s long-term remains unresolved and will likely provide Iran with another major source of leverage. Tehran has continued to signal that transit fees may ultimately be imposed under alternative mechanisms, including service or environmental charges. However, such an arrangement is likely to be unacceptable to the US and the international community, as it would almost certainly be inconsistent with international maritime law and the principle of freedom of navigation. If naval blockades are lifted and commercial transits increase, mine-clearance operations and continued sub-threshold disruptions, including GPS jamming, Automatic Identification System (AIS) spoofing, and the harassment of vessels by the IRGC, are likely to pose risks to maritime traffic.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: