Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

The announcement of the MoU’s agreement is almost certainly the biggest diplomatic breakthrough since the implementation of the 8 April two-week ceasefire. Although reportedly already signed remotely, the MoU has not yet been formally signed, with its signing ceremony scheduled for 19 June. With its signing, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, the MoU is likely only to be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. The reported agreement is likely vulnerable to continuing conflict in Lebanon, disagreements on the nuclear file, and issues pertaining to the Strait of Hormuz.

A US force withdrawal from the region is reportedly tied to progress on further negotiations. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, renewed escalation could rapidly break out with minimal indicators and warnings.

If the MoU collapses, there is a realistic possibility of renewed Iranian strikes against targets in Jordan and the Gulf States. Iranian strikes post-8 April ceasefire have recently escalated in both scale and targeting profile. If recent Iranian targeting patterns are to be sustained, Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain are likely to be more exposed in the event of a ceasefire breakdown.

Lebanon

The first significant test for the MoU is likely to be the continuation of Israeli operations in Lebanon. The MoU reportedly includes an end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon. However, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, has stated that the IDF will indefinitely remain in the security zone in Lebanon, with IDF operations in southern Lebanon continuing as recently as 16 June.

Senior Israeli officials and politicians have largely reacted negatively to the MoU’s announcement. Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has stated that the MoU is “bad for Israel” and “the entire free world”, and the National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has stated that Israel is not bound to the deal “in any way”. Israeli opposition to the MoU is almost certainly reflective of concerns that the agreement does not satisfy Israel’s key objectives. Israeli opposition or unilateral military action could complicate the MoU’s implementation or undermine the agreement at a later stage.

Moreover, Hezbollah is likely to sustain attacks against the IDF and northern Israel in response to continued IDF operations. A Hezbollah official told international media that the group has not carried out operations since the MoU was announced, but that its position would be linked to Israel’s adherence to a ceasefire. Additionally, Tehran is likely to continue leveraging the threat of force in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon, not only to provide support for Hezbollah, but also to pressure concessions from the US in negotiations, as regime officials have claimed to have done so on 14 June.

The Nuclear File

The primary issue that impeded progress in the Oman-mediated US-Iran talks, which preceded the outbreak of conflict on 28 February, was the nuclear file. The MoU reportedly only involves a reiteration of Iran’s past commitment to never acquire or procure a nuclear weapon, with technical talks on the nuclear file deferred to a post-MoU 60-day negotiation window.

The main disputes during the pre-28 February negotiations are likely to continue to complicate talks. The most difficult issues to resolve will almost certainly be Iran’s buried stockpile of approximately 440.9kg of 60 per cent highly enriched uranium (HEU), enough to produce approximately ten nuclear weapons if enriched further, and whether Iran will be permitted to retain any domestic enrichment capability.

The Trump administration’s pre-war position was that Iran suspend all enrichment and physically surrender the HEU stockpile to the US, with Tehran consistently stating that the HEU must remain in Iran. However, Washington’s position has reportedly softened on both fronts. Reports indicate that Washington may be willing to accept Iran domestically down-blending the HEU under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as accepting limited low-level domestic enrichment.

While the specifics of the MoU remain undisclosed, senior US officials and leaders (including Vice President JD Vance) have stated that key incentives such as sanctions relief, regional investment funds, and access to frozen assets will be tied to the resolution of the nuclear file in the 60-day window. There is a realistic possibility that these incentives, in combination with the observed softening of the US position on nuclear demands, could lead to a nuclear agreement. However, assessments by the US intelligence community, as reportedly briefed to President Trump by the CIA Director John Ratcliffe, are reported to have raised “serious doubts about Iran’s willingness” to make desired nuclear concessions.

Much of the MoU is reportedly contingent on future nuclear negotiations, with US sanctions and the current regional force posture set to remain in place until a final nuclear agreement is reached. The 60-day negotiation period is likely to remain highly vulnerable as it centres on the same nuclear issues that have repeatedly obstructed diplomatic progress. Any breakdown in these talks would likely place the ceasefire under immediate strain.

The Strait of Hormuz

The reported initial steps in the deal primarily revolve around efforts to open the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump has stated that the Strait’s opening and concurrent end of the US blockade will take place upon the MoU’s formal signing on 19 June. However, it is highly unlikely that if the MoU is implemented, the Strait will immediately return to its pre-war status. Mine-clearance operations will still need to be conducted, while continued messaging from Tehran over its future management of the Strait is likely to sustain uncertainty over maritime security and freedom of navigation. GPS-jamming, AIS spoofing, the harassment of vessels and other forms of sub-threshold disruption are likely to remain common.

The MoU reportedly involves the Strait of Hormuz being reopened without tolls, with an objective to return to pre-war shipping volumes within 30 days. While Iranian regime sources have softened the language from “tolls”, regime and IRGC-linked media have repeatedly indicated that payments could still be imposed for transit under the guise of “environmental protection” or “service charges”. IRGC-affiliated media have reported that Tehran has only agreed to allow free passage for vessels for 60 days, with plans to collect revenues from various fees following this period. Moreover, a spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry directly stated that Iran will charge for services in the Strait of Hormuz.

A conclusive resolution on the future management of the Strait of Hormuz also appears to have been deferred, leaving a key source of leverage and potential escalation unresolved. It is highly likely that Tehran will seek to preserve leverage over the strategic chokepoint while gradually normalising a greater long-term role in its administration. Such a development is unlikely to be accepted by the US and the international community, as it would directly challenge maritime law and the principles of freedom of navigation.

While an end to the US blockade and gradual opening of the Strait would likely reduce the primary tactical trigger for US-Iranian escalation in the short-term, which has repeatedly led to Iranian strikes against several Gulf States and Jordan, continued Iranian efforts to maintain greater control over the Strait are highly likely to lead to continued high tensions, challenge any implemented ceasefire and undermine future negotiations.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: