Global Intelligence Summary

The first round of Colombia’s presidential election was held on 31 May. The vote returned a victory for Abelardo de la Espriella, the candidate of the populist right-wing National Salvation Movement (MSN), with 43.7 per cent of the vote. De la Espriella finished ahead of Senator Iván Cepeda (40.9 per cent), the candidate of the left-wing Historic Pact (PH) endorsed by current President Gustavo Petro. The third candidate who was considered to have a chance to reach the second round, Senator Paloma Valencia of the centre-right Democratic Centre (CD), performed poorly, only receiving 6.9 per cent of the total votes. Valencia quickly endorsed de la Espriella after the results were published.

Following the vote, President Petro alleged that the electoral results were doctored. Cepeda, who was widely expected to win the most votes, also initially made allegations of fraud, but subsequently retracted them. The second round of the election is scheduled to take place on 21 June, where the winner will become the next Colombian president.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The results of the first round will almost certainly produce a second round marked by extreme polarisation. The Colombian electoral campaign was largely characterised as a referendum on “Total Peace”, the flagship programme of the Petro administration (of which Cepeda is considered one of the leading architects), that allows the government to negotiate with criminal groups. While Cepeda has advocated for its continuation, de la Espriella has campaigned on a tough-on-crime platform partially resembling that of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, which has involved mass detentions, troop deployments and the building of mega prisons.

International observers stated that the elections were largely free and fair. However, the non-governmental Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) documented hundreds of suspected irregularities, including suspected attempts by armed groups to intimidate voters. Heading into the runoff round, the threat from armed groups is likely to become more prevalent. While Colombia’s powerful cartels and militias did not carry out a concerted attempt to alter the election results during the first round, the second round is likely to be more at risk of interference.

De la Espriella has promised to take an “Iron Fist” approach with organised crime groups and militant groups in Colombia. His presidency would almost certainly involve expanded security operations and would be interpreted as more of a threat to Colombia’s armed groups. This is likely to provide cartels and armed groups with a greater incentive to influence the election and could increase the risk of voter intimidation and electoral interference, especially as de la Espriella is out-polling Cepeda in 16 of Colombia’s 32 departments, primarily in the heart of Colombia and near the border with Venezuela, where armed groups are heavily embedded and best positioned to exert influence over the electoral process. A potential de la Espriella presidency has also likely increased the risk of high-profile attacks aimed at deterring the incoming administration from adopting a more aggressive security posture or abandoning existing negotiation processes.

The second round is likely to return a very close and potentially contested result. Valencia’s endorsement of de la Espriella theoretically guarantees the right-wing candidate a majority, assuming voting behaviour does not significantly change in the second round. However, de la Espriella’s polarising platform could backfire by alienating centrist voters or by influencing a higher turnout of left-wing or centrist voters in support of Cepeda. In the 2022 Colombian presidential election, the second-round turnout increased by four percentage points. A close result would likely increase the risk of fraud allegations from the losing side, which could trigger large-scale protests in the immediate aftermath of the vote.