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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Sustained Iranian Attacks Reshape Gulf Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 20 Mar 2026 – 23 Mar 2026

  • Since 28 February, Iran has conducted missile and attack drone strikes against targets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The attacks have continued into 23 March.
  • In response to a 48-hour ultimatum delivered by US President Donald Trump to Iran on 21 March to open the Strait of Hormuz, or the US would conduct strikes against Iranian power plants, Tehran issued threats to “irreversibly destroy” critical national infrastructure across the region, including desalination plants. On 23 March, President Trump stated that the ultimatum would be extended for a “FIVE DAY PERIOD” due to claimed productive talks.
  • Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media published a list of power and desalination plants that would be targeted in retaliation strikes, in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.
  • The Gulf States are highly dependent on desalination for drinking water, domestic use, and industrial purposes. Sustained attacks on desalination facilities are likely to have significant impacts on national water security in the Gulf States.
  • Iran has continued strikes against civilian targets, economic assets and critical national infrastructure. Attacks have resulted in material damage at airports, ports, desalination plants, international hotels, government offices, oil and gas infrastructure, and locations hosting US military personnel.
  • The scale of Iranian ballistic missile and attack drone strike packages launched at the Gulf states has decreased since 28 February. However, regular attack drone and lower volume ballistic missile attacks are likely to remain frequent in the short-to-medium term. Heavy air defence interceptor usage is likely reducing stockpiles in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, potentially forcing air defences to prioritise targets and increasing the likelihood of successful penetrations.
  • As of 23 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait; Bahrain’s airspace is effectively closed with very limited exceptions; Qatar is allowing limited flights with prior permission; the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones; Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; and Oman and Jordan’s airspaces remain open.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 23 March.

On 21 March, US President Donald Trump gave a 48-hour ultimatum (expected expiry at approximately midnight UTC, 23 March) to Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, or the US and Israel would “obliterate” Iran’s power plants. In response, Iran’s Parliament Speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, stated that Iran would “irreversibly destroy” critical national infrastructure across the region. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked FarsNews Agency published a list of potential targets, which included major power plants and desalination plants across the region.

On the morning of 23 March, President Trump stated on social media that due to “VERY GOOD AND PRODUCTIVE CONVERSATIONS” with Iran, he had “INSTRUCTED THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR TO POSTPΟΝΕ ΑΝΥ AND ALL MILITARY STRIKES AGAINST IRANIAN POWER PLANTS AND ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A FIVE DAY PERIOD, SUBJECT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE ONGOING MEETINGS AND DISCUSSIONS.”

As of 23 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling a highly limited number of departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission, but the airspace is effectively closed to almost all commercial flights. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains restricted, although arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Saudi forces carried out several missile and drone interceptions during the 20-22 March period. At least two ballistic missiles fell into uninhabited areas. Riyadh region, the Eastern Province, and Al-Kharj governorate remained the areas most targeted by Iranian projectiles. On 23 March, Saudi authorities claimed to have intercepted at least four drones over the Eastern Province and two ballistic missiles over the Riyadh region, with an additional missile falling in an uninhabited area.

On 21 March, the Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry announced that it had declared several Iranian military attaché officials and embassy staff personae non gratae, following the Iranian attack on Yanbu refinery. On the same day, international media reported that Saudi authorities had decided to authorise US forces to utilise the King Fahd Air Base in Taif for strikes against Iran.

The threats issued by IRGC-linked media against critical national infrastructure in the region, if the US conducts attacks against Iranian power plants, included the Ras Al-Khair (north of Dammam) and Al-Shu’iba (south of Jeddah) power and desalination plants in Saudi Arabia.

At least two people have been killed and 20 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 09:00 UTC on 23 March.

As of 23 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

On 22 March, the Kuwaiti military stated they had intercepted four drones, with three additional ones crashing in uninhabited areas. Kuwaiti officials have reiterated their calls on residents to “adhere to the security and safety instructions issued by the competent authorities”.

The threats issued by IRGC-linked media against critical national infrastructure in the region, if the US conducts attacks against Iranian power plants, included the Al-Zour power and desalination plant in Kuwait.  

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 23 March.

As of 23 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Between 20 and 23 March, Bahrain activated its air raid sirens multiple times, with the public urged to take shelter. On 22 March, Bahraini officials stated that more than 246 drones and 145 missiles from Iran have been intercepted since the start of the conflict in late February.

The threats issued by IRGC-linked media against critical national infrastructure in the region, if the US conducts attacks against Iranian power plants, included the Al-Dur power and desalination plant in Bahrain.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 23 March.

As of 23 March, the Bahraini airspace is closed with very limited exceptions. Bahrain is enabling a highly limited number of departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission, but the airspace is effectively closed to almost all commercial flights.

On 22 March, a military helicopter carrying Qatari and Turkish personnel crashed in Qatari territorial waters. According to authorities, the crash, which killed seven people, was caused by a “technical malfunction” and occurred during a “training exercise”.

The threats issued by IRGC-linked media against critical national infrastructure in the region, if the US conducts attacks against Iranian power plants, included the Umm Al-Hol power and desalination plant and the Ras Laffan/Ras Qartas power and desalination plant in Qatar.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 23 March.

As of 23 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. Arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are allowed after permission has been given.

The United Arab Emirates faced repeated Iranian missile and drone threats over the weekend, with Emirati authorities activating air defences multiple times. On 21 March, explosions were heard in Ras al-Khaimah as air defences responded to an Iranian attack. On 22 March, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence said it responded to four Iranian missiles and 25 drones. Late 22 March and into 23 March, authorities again warned residents to remain in safe locations as air defence systems were activated, and the military later said it had engaged seven Iranian ballistic missiles and 16 drones. Late 22 March, local authorities said at least one Indian national was injured after debris from a missile interception fell in the Al Shawamekh area of Abu Dhabi. On 23 March, the Habshan gas processing plant reportedly resumed operations after last week’s attack prompted a suspension.

The threats issued by IRGC-linked media against critical national infrastructure in the region, if the US conducts attacks against Iranian power plants, included the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant and Tawilah Desalination Plant in the UAE, each in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.

At least eight people have been killed and 160 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 23 March.

As of 23 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

In a claimed written statement by Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on Nowruz (Persian New Year), 20 March, Khamenei denied that attacks carried out against Oman were conducted by Iran’s armed forces or Iranian proxy forces, effectively claiming that the attacks were ‘false flag’ attacks by the US and Israel. This is almost certainly reflective of distinct efforts by the surviving central political leadership of Tehran to distance themselves from the attacks against Oman, given Oman’s key role in previous mediation efforts between the US and Iran.

Separately from the Middle East conflict, heavy rainfall through 22 March has led to weather warnings being issued by authorities, including in Muscat, with flash flooding recorded in Al-Musannah, Wadi Al Maawil, Seeb, and Sur.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring UAE and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 23 March.

As of 23 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.


Further Iranian strikes remain highly likely in the near term. While US military installations likely remain the highest priority target, Iranian strikes will also likely continue targeting civilian-profile sites. Iran has continued strikes against civilian-profile targets and economic interests, airports, including oil and gas infrastructure and desalination facilities. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to carry out further attacks on US and Israeli-linked companies across the region.

The ultimatum given by President Trump to Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, which has now been extended as per the President’s social media post on the morning of 23 March from a 48-hour period to a “FIVE DAY PERIOD”, would likely lead to significant retaliation strikes by Iran should the US threat to “obliterate” Iran’s power plants be carried out. Messaging from senior Iranian political figures and regime-linked media outlets strongly indicates that critical energy infrastructure, in addition to desalination plants, which are critical for many Gulf States, would be targeted by Iranian strikes as retaliation for attacks against Iranian power plants.

The Gulf States are highly dependent on desalination for drinking water, domestic use, and industrial purposes. Between 90-99 per cent of drinking water is derived from desalination in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE; 86 per cent in Oman; and 70 per cent in Saudi Arabia. Excluding small household units or particular factories, desalination is not used for water supply in Jordan. Sustained attacks on desalination facilities are likely to have significant impacts on national water security in the Gulf States.

In addition to US or Israeli targeting of Iranian oil and gas infrastructure, as well as power plants, the killing of senior Iranian military or political officials will likewise trigger increased rates of Iranian strikes in retaliation, as followed the 17 March killing of Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani.

While interception rates overall remain high, there have been numerous recorded cases of projectiles penetrating air defences. There is also a high risk of secondary impacts, including debris from intercepted threats, further extended airspace closures, maritime traffic interference, and wider transport and commercial disruption across the region.

Reporting indicates that the volume of both Iranian ballistic missiles and attack drones launched at the Gulf states has significantly diminished since 28 February, almost certainly due to expended stockpiles and the destruction of transporter erector launchers (TELs) by US-Israeli strikes. However, attack drone use has remained high enough to conduct almost daily attacks, and Iran continues to be capable of launching sporadic ballistic missiles, particularly at high-value targets (HVTs) such as oil and gas infrastructure.

Sustained Iranian attack drone and missile strikes are likely to result in critical shortages of air defence interceptors across the region, especially in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Critical shortages in air defence interceptors will likely force air defence systems to prioritise targets and increase the likelihood of successful penetrations. Furthermore, Iranian strikes have damaged regional air defence infrastructure, including radar systems critical for early warning, target acquisition, and tracking, likely degrading detection capabilities and reducing reaction times for air defence systems.

It is highly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage or military activity. In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal, with at least 45 people being arrested so far, including a British tourist who allegedly filmed missile strikes in Dubai. In Bahrain, at least two individuals have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and has arrested at least 313 people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”. Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.