US and Israel Prepare for Potential Renewed Strikes on Iran

Indicators and warnings (I&W) of renewed US or joint US-Israeli strikes against Iran have increased materially in the last few weeks and almost certainly indicate that renewed operations against Iran are at an advanced stage. Ongoing Qatari-led mediation is unlikely to produce a lasting resolution in the near term. Reports indicate that preparations for a series of high-intensity strikes against Iran have been finalised, with any resumption of attacks almost certain to trigger a severe Iranian response.

Further I&W of imminent US-Israeli operations could include the following, although these indicators would not necessarily need to be observed ahead of renewed strikes:

Negotiations have continued to stall, with neither party appearing willing to make the concessions required to reach a substantive agreement. Tehran likely considers another round of conflict preferable to making demanded concessions, while IRGC hardliners are highly unlikely to accept any terms that could be perceived as surrender. Conversely, accepting Iran’s offer to reopen the SoH in exchange for sanctions relief and the lifting of the blockade would require Washington to relinquish its primary leverage without securing the nuclear concessions used to justify the war. Reverting to the more favourable June MoU terms remains a possible off-ramp, but is unlikely given Washington’s strengthened negotiating position, achieved through its blockade of Iranian maritime trade and expanded sanctions.

Moreover, the observed I&W almost certainly indicates that preparations for renewed operations against Iran are at a highly advanced stage. The withdrawal of military personnel and diplomatic staff is likely intended to reduce their exposure to any Iranian retaliation following the resumption of offensive operations. Comparable withdrawals were ordered prior to US strikes against Iran in June 2025 and February 2026.

The US currently has two aircraft carriers deployed to the CENTCOM AoR, alongside additional naval combat power and land-based combat aircraft, providing substantial capability to conduct sustained, high-intensity strikes against Iran with limited advanced warning.

The arrival of the Roosevelt CSG would provide additional combat power and operational freedom. However, a third CSG is not a prerequisite for renewed strikes against Iran, and strategic bombers are not required to conduct sustained high-intensity strikes against the majority of Iranian targets.

Moreover, the likely involvement of Israeli combat aircraft, supported by US aerial refuelling assets, would significantly increase the combined force’s available strike capacity. A reported 200 Israeli fighter jets participated in Operation Roaring Lion, with a CSG typically embarking approximately 40–50 fighter jets. Recent Israeli sorties close to Iran may have been an attempt to probe Iranian air defences and assess response times.

While further I&W could be observed, the combined force already has sufficient combat power in the region to initiate sustained, high-intensity strikes against Iran with limited additional preparation or warning. The observed I&W indicate that renewed strikes are highly likely in the coming weeks, and could be authorised imminently. However, the final political decision and precise timing remain unconfirmed.

Iran has threatened multiple times that any strikes would provoke a major escalation. Iranian officials have explicitly threatened to target US military installations and personnel across the Middle East, as well as regional energy infrastructure, airports, ports, desalination plants, shipping, undersea cables, telecommunications infrastructure, data centres and other strategic infrastructure associated with US interests.

Iran’s response would highly likely involve attacks in Israel, Jordan and the Gulf States. Given the ongoing Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia and the expansion of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, there is a realistic possibility that Tehran could concentrate its direct retaliation against other Gulf states to avoid a Turkish or Pakistani response, while relying on the Houthis and Iran-aligned Iraqi militias to sustain attacks on Saudi Arabia. However, the extent to which either country would intervene remains uncertain, and Saudi Arabia cannot be excluded from Iran’s potential target set.

Iran has also warned that retaliation will have no limits and has threatened to expand the geographical scope and target set of its response. Previous escalation cycles have involved reported Iranian attacks in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Cyprus, likely demonstrating the potential for hostilities to extend beyond the Middle East.

US intelligence has warned of Iranian plots to target US government officials and personnel across the Middle East, indicating that Tehran may pursue asymmetric operations alongside conventional military retaliation. Iran has previously been implicated in assassinations and attacks far beyond the Middle East.

Iran has also established a pattern of reciprocal targeting, whereby its forces conduct attacks against infrastructure similar to that targeted by US or Israeli strikes. The nature of US-Israeli joint strikes against Iran, with Iranian energy infrastructure reportedly included in strike planning, would likely indicate the types of targets Iran may select for retaliation across the region; however, Iranian threats suggest a potential expansion of its target set.

Reports indicate that Iran has exploited the cessation of direct hostilities to regroup, reorganise and reconstitute its long-range strike capabilities, and has increased the production of several weapon systems. This would likely enable Iran to conduct high-volume, layered missile and UAV attacks over a sustained period, increasing the likelihood of overstretching or saturating regional air defences, especially if attacks are coordinated with regional allies, including the Houthis and Iraqi militias, from multiple axes.

Despite the degradation of its military capabilities, Hezbollah likely retains a limited ability to conduct attacks against Israel. Israel’s new defence doctrine states that Hezbollah attacks will result in Israeli strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs and further territorial advances into southern Lebanon, likely reflecting Israeli concerns over Hezbollah’s involvement and an attempt to deter its participation.

Previous high-intensity Iranian strikes, Houthi attacks in Saudi Arabia, combined with prolonged production timeframes and increased global demand, have likely resulted in shortages in regional air defences. There is a realistic possibility that reduced interceptor availability, combined with an expanded Iranian target set and the use of large, coordinated missile and UAV salvos, could result in increased penetration rates and more successful strikes. However, successful interceptions also pose a major threat to civilians. Falling debris has resulted in multiple fatalities and injuries across the region.

Israel maintains a highly advanced and generally reliable early-warning system, combining air-raid sirens with location-specific mobile alerts. However, early-warning and alerting systems across the Gulf vary considerably in coverage and reliability. Previous attacks have resulted in warnings being issued too late or not being issued at all.

Due to the ongoing conflict in Yemen, which has involved multiple attacks on Saudi airports, air travel to and from the Kingdom has been severely disrupted. Renewed Iranian strikes will likely result in regional airspace closures and flight cancellations. Iran has previously targeted regional airports during previous escalation cycles and is likely to do so in response to renewed US-Israeli strikes. With Saudi airports already experiencing significant operational disruption, a major escalation is likely to severely disrupt regional air travel and limit opportunities to evacuate the region.

Increased demand, border congestion and potential restrictions on cross-border movement may further limit opportunities. Attacks and airspace closures in Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE would almost certainly disrupt key alternative routes into and out of Saudi Arabia, particularly where travellers rely on neighbouring airports for onward international flights.