Israel Elections 2026: Political Instability & Regional Security Risks

On 27 October, Israel will hold an election to appoint the 120 members of the Knesset, with the seats being allocated by national closed-list proportional representation. It will be the first Knesset election since the 7 October 2023 attacks, which were followed by the war in Gaza and significantly altered the security landscape in the Middle East. The vote occurs at a moment of high political instability for Israel. The country has been engaged in conflict in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, with none of these conflicts fully resolved.  

Domestically, Israel continues to record almost daily protests against the government over several major scandals, in addition to a protest movement led by ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis against the conscription of yeshiva students into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which has continued for more than two years.

Israel’s relations with key allies, including the US, have become strained. Only days after the Knesset vote, the US midterms on 3 November are likely to be marked by the victory of several candidates for Congress who have campaigned on platforms highly critical of Israel. Moreover, the recent emergence of the Mecca Pact, a mutual defence agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan on 7 August, has further threatened Israel’s geopolitical positioning by likely advancing an alternative regional security framework to that promoted by Washington with the US-brokered Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco.

The political environment in Israel is polarised and fragmented. Most available polls for the 27 October election indicate that no bloc will be able to secure a majority (61) of seats in the 120-member Knesset.

The bloc supporting the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which comprises Netanyahu’s party Likud, the far-right Otzma Yehudit, and the alliance between the Religious Zionism Party and the libertarian Zehut (RZP-Zehut), with the additional conditional support of the ultra-Orthodox parties United Torah Judaism (UTJ, largely Ashkenazi) and Shas (largely Sephardi/Mizrahi), is projected to win around 51-55 seats as of mid-October, after polls showed it gaining more support since September.

The opposition bloc, comprising the liberal Yashar party, the Together (B’Yachad) alliance, the social democratic Democrats Party, and the right-wing Yisrael Beitenu, has an estimated 50-54 seats.

The two Arab parties, Ra’am and the Joint List, are together projected to win 12-13 seats, and several smaller parties hover around the electoral threshold of 3.25 per cent of votes required to enter parliament, including the non-aligned alliance between the New Economic Party and the Reservists party, and the newly formed nationalist People of Israel (Amcha Yisrael) party, which is allied with Netanyahu. As clearing the threshold grants parties at least four seats, smaller parties succeeding in entering parliament could significantly alter the dynamics of possible alliances.

The blocs themselves are somewhat fragmented. While the pro-government and opposition camps are sharply differentiated by their support for or opposition to Netanyahu, they also disagree internally on key issues. Within the pro-government bloc, the ultra-Orthodox draft issue puts parties like UTJ and Shas, which broadly favour exempting yeshiva students from serving in the IDF and have stated that they will oppose future governments that will not grant the exemptions, against parts of Likud and the small Amcha Yisrael party, which has pledged to join future governments only if a law mandating ultra-Orthodox service is passed before that government is formed. The coalition is also divided over the ongoing crisis between the government and the Supreme Court, centred on legislation regarding the regulation of commercial television, with Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi calling on the government to disregard the court’s rulings, a position that worries centrist government supporters.

Inside the opposition, the differences are likely even more marked. On policy towards the Palestinians, parties like B’Yachad and Yisrael Beitenu are generally as hawkish as, if not more hawkish than, the current government, advocating for an expansion of the settlements alongside a hardline military posture in the West Bank and Gaza, whereas the Democrats are open to a two-state solution. While the Democrats and, to a lesser extent, Yashar have advocated for pragmatic engagement with the Arab parties, which could give the opposition a numerical majority in the Knesset, the rest of the coalition opposes such cooperation. In economic policy terms, the parties cover a vast range of positions, from the social democracy promoted by the Democrats to the economic liberalism of B’Yachad and Yisrael Beitenu.

Following the publication of official results, expected approximately eight days after the vote, President Isaac Herzog is scheduled to consult the parties and, within seven days, subsequently assign the mandate to the Member of Knesset (MK) judged most likely to form a government. That MK has 28 days, extendable by up to 14 days.  Should this fail, a second nominee is given 28 days, or the president can instead trigger the next stage. In this final phase, a 21-day window opens, during which 61 MKs can jointly nominate a candidate, who then has 14 days to form a government. If all stages fail, the Knesset dissolves automatically, and new elections follow, approximately 90 days later. The outgoing government would remain in office as a caretaker administration throughout.

The sharp disagreements both within the government and opposition coalitions indicate that the election will highly likely result in a protracted coalition formation process, likely to exceed the first 28+14 day cycle. This would entail Netanyahu remaining in power as a caretaker Prime Minister throughout the remainder of 2026 on procedural timelines alone, with the coalition-formation process likely to extend into early 2027. This scenario would highly likely contribute to protracted instability and civil unrest, with activist groups and protest movements seeking to influence the parties as they debate a possible policy agenda for the next government. The main drivers of unrest are likely to be the ultra-Orthodox draft issue, anti-government protests linked to the crisis between the executive and the judiciary, and, in the West Bank, settler violence.

In terms of government likelihood, polls have shifted in favour of the Netanyahu bloc since September, with most surveys now placing it level with or slightly ahead of the opposition. However, even in the case of a victory for the pro-Netanyahu bloc, government formation is likely to be complicated by the ultra-Orthodox draft issue. Amcha Yisrael’s precondition that a conscription law be passed before a government is formed is directly incompatible with the demand of Shas and UTJ for a permanent exemption. A Netanyahu-led coalition would therefore likely depend on one of the two sides conceding, or on ad hoc support from outside the bloc.

The most probable scenario following an opposition victory thus remains a broad coalition led by the Yashar party, with party leader Gadi Eisenkot being the most likely prime minister from the opposition bloc. This coalition would likely fall short of a majority, based on available polling, and would have to seek ad hoc support from the Arab parties, the Reservists, or members of the Netanyahu bloc. In all cases, negotiation processes are likely to become drivers of civil unrest, and could result in the next government remaining highly unstable throughout the early stages of its mandate.

ASSESSMENT

Since late 2023, Israel has engaged in several simultaneous conflicts. The upcoming vote will almost certainly influence their forward trajectories, although some theatres will likely be more exposed to change than others. The West Bank is the area where a change of government is most likely to translate into different policies, while Gaza is the least likely to be affected.

The West Bank is the area where an opposition government is most likely to implement different policies from the current Netanyahu-led executive. Opposition leaders have decried the incumbent coalition’s hardline approach to the West Bank as damaging to Israeli security at home and abroad. While not advocating for a retrenchment of the settlements, opposition leaders have pledged to address the rising issue of settler violence in the West Bank. Naftali Bennett, former prime minister and leader of the B’Yachad alliance, called settler groups “violent gangs”, while Yair Lapid, the other senior B’Yachad figure and also a former prime minister, referred to settler violence as a form of “Jewish terrorism”.

Many opposition leaders have claimed a direct link between settler violence and a deterioration in Israel’s reputation in Europe and the US. An opposition government will likely seek to reduce settler violence in the short term through increased IDF deployments in at-risk areas, while not committing to reducing the number or extension of the settlements themselves.

Gaza is likely to be least impacted by the upcoming election. The situation in Gaza has recently remained relatively static, despite the lack of progress in the implementation of the US-brokered Gaza Peace Plan. Hamas has been severely degraded and is likely now unable to significantly threaten southern Israel. The IDF, which had expanded its control to approximately 70 per cent of the Gaza Strip by July, according to some reports, pulled back towards the original Yellow Line (around 53 per cent) in August, although other reports argue that the IDF still maintains control of 65-70 per cent.

The IDF has also maintained a policy of decapitation strikes on remaining Hamas leaders to prevent the group from coordinating and regrouping. Three Hamas brigade commanders have been killed since mid-September, while the IDF has sustained comparatively few casualties relative to earlier stages of the conflict. The opposition, which broadly agrees on the necessity to disarm Hamas as a prelude to the implementation of a lasting solution, is unlikely to order any major withdrawals from Gaza or make any significant policy changes, unless it succeeds in making more progress on other fronts. Eisenkot’s statement, on 15 October, that he will remove Hamas from ruling the Gaza Strip “within 18 months of [Eisenkot] taking office as a prime minister”, likely indicates that an opposition government would push the task of resolving the conflict in the Gaza Strip into 2027 and possibly even 2028.

Following Gaza, Lebanon is the front that is least likely to be affected by any potential change in government. Leaders of the opposition coalition share the Netanyahu government’s objective of preventing Hezbollah from re-infiltrating parts of southern Lebanon or reconstituting its capabilities, developments that would allow it to threaten northern Israel. Moreover, they are also sceptical of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) ability to implement the “pilot zones” programme and take over area control responsibilities from the IDF. The expiry of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mandate on 31 December 2026, followed by the mission’s withdrawal in 2027, could nevertheless present a challenge to a hypothetical new government, potentially creating a security vacuum that could be exploited by Hezbollah. Given the volatile security environment in Lebanon, significant changes on the ground could force a new government to reconsider its military posture and operational objectives, potentially resulting in a departure from the current government’s approach despite the broad alignment in their strategic objectives.

In Syria, a new Israeli government would inherit a very unstable position. After the fall of Assad, the Netanyahu government successfully degraded Syria’s conventional military strength and occupied strategically valuable positions in the country’s south, including Mount Hermon. As the new transitional government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa solidified its control over the country and bolstered relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Israel’s position in the south has likely become a growing source of friction with both Damascus and regional powers.

Any Israeli government will likely continue to oppose growing Turkish-Syrian cooperation. Israel is not only concerned about growing Turkish influence in Syria, but also the restoration of Syria’s military capabilities. The deployment of Turkish aircraft, air defence systems and surveillance radars could significantly restrict Israeli freedom of action over Syrian airspace, undermining its ability to target Iranian weapons transfers to Hezbollah and conduct operations against Iran. Consequently, any new government would likely continue efforts to prevent Syria’s military reconstitution and deter an expanded Turkish military presence.

However, some Israeli leaders likely believe that a post-Assad Syria could be leveraged to weaken Iran and Hezbollah’s footprint on the Mediterranean, and an opposition-led Israeli government may seek to reach an agreement with Syria, possibly by leveraging territorial concessions. In an interview published on 6 October 2026, Eisenkot stated that there is an “opportunity” for a new agreement with al-Sharaa’s Syria, noting that Israel could also seek to obtain “the complete expulsion of the Turks and Russians from the area”.

An Israeli government amenable to negotiations with Damascus could also tie territorial concessions to other demands, such as securing Israeli Air Force freedom of operations over Syrian airspace, or increased Syrian efforts to dismantle Hezbollah cross-border smuggling efforts. Eisenkot has also directly tied the necessity of improving relations with Syria to Washington’s own policy towards Damascus, which has significantly warmed since the fall of Assad.

An opposition-led government is unlikely to fundamentally alter Israel’s position on Iran. Opposition leaders publicly share Netanyahu’s view that Iran obtaining nuclear weapons poses an existential risk to Israel, and will continue to leave the option of using military force to prevent Tehran from developing a nuclear weapons capability.

In some aspects, the opposition has even advocated for more hawkish policies against Iran than the Netanyahu coalition. In September, Eisenkot reportedly proposed that the US create “kill zones” around areas where Iran’s remaining 60 per cent enriched uranium stockpile is believed to be located, backed by a public commitment to strike any attempt to move the nuclear material until a lasting agreement is reached. Furthermore, Eisenkot stated that he would intensify operations, including covert Mossad actions, against Iran’s missile infrastructure. An opposition-led government would likely continue to prioritise cooperation with the US against Iran, seeing joint action as presenting a more credible deterrent to Iranian military activity.

The above scenarios assume that a new government would assume power under conditions of stability. However, tensions with Iran remain high, a long-term de-escalation framework remains elusive and high-intensity fighting could resume with limited warning. Depending on the date of an escalation or whether it directly involves Israel, renewed hostilities could disrupt the election itself or complicate subsequent coalition negotiations and government formation. A resumption of major operations before the Knesset election involving Israel has the potential to postpone the election entirely.

Since the beginning of October, the likelihood of full-scale conflict resuming has increased. On 7 October, reports emerged that the Pentagon had instructed US Central Command (CENTCOM) to conclude preparations for a resumption of major combat operations against Iran. US and Israeli officials briefed that strikes, potentially targeting nuclear, infrastructure and energy sites and conducted jointly with Israel, could also take place before the 3 November US midterm elections and possibly even the Knesset election. On the following day, reporting indicated that the Pentagon had drawn up plans for an intense, three-day campaign targeting Iran’s missile and drone arsenals, and potentially also energy facilities and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command sites.

On 8 October, US President Donald Trump publicly stated that the US would not attack Iran before the midterm elections. However, Trump has previously leveraged deception and strategic ambiguity around potential military action, almost certainly reducing the reliability of this pledge, and the statement does not preclude escalation initiated by Israel, Iran or Iranian proxies.

CENTCOM’s preparations for renewed full-scale operations are highly likely to be genuine. The deployment of an additional carrier strike group (CSG), additional amphibious forces and thousands of personnel likely indicates that US military pressure on Iran will be sustained and potentially escalate. The weeks following the 3 November US midterm elections, which will coincide with coalition negotiations in Israel, remain the most likely window for renewed major military operations, given the potential political costs of escalation before the vote. However, even a short, intensive three-day campaign of the type reportedly under consideration would be unlikely to remain contained. Iranian retaliation would likely be substantial, with a greater emphasis on targeting regional energy infrastructure than in previous exchanges, particularly if Iranian oil, gas or other energy facilities were targeted.

If the conflict with Iran were to escalate before 27 October, this would almost certainly significantly impact the elections. IDF chief Eyal Zamir reportedly warned that a renewed joint US-Israeli campaign could postpone the elections, according to Israeli media reporting citing US officials. This would follow the precedent of 1973, when the Knesset elections were postponed from October to December due to the Yom Kippur War. Such a move would be unlikely to immediately spark protests in Israel, as the threat of Iranian strikes would deter large gatherings, but would likely be highly politically destabilising in the medium term.

Constitutionally, the Netanyahu government would need a two-thirds supermajority of 80 members of the Knesset to approve a postponement, which would require opposition support. If this fails to materialise and a hypothetical conflict remains ongoing, Israel could seek to hold wartime elections as it did for the local vote in February 2024, which was also held after two postponements. This could significantly disrupt campaigning and voting, particularly in areas exposed to missile attacks, while the mobilisation of reservists, displacement of civilians and restrictions on public gatherings could suppress voter turnout and raise questions over the legitimacy of the results.

However, the significantly higher threat from Iran compared to that from Hamas and Hezbollah in 2024 would almost certainly reduce the feasibility of holding such elections.  If the government fails to secure the required supermajority to postpone the vote, but the security environment makes holding elections unfeasible, Israel could face an unprecedented constitutional crisis, with significant implications for political stability and an increased risk of civil unrest.

If full-scale war restarts after the Knesset vote, it would likely significantly complicate or delay the government formation process, with a Netanyahu caretaker government likely being given wartime authority. In this scenario, there is a higher likelihood of Israeli President Isaac Herzog advocating for the creation of a broad national unity government, as after the 7 October attacks. Given Eisenkot’s rejection of a rotation government and his statement that Netanyahu is unfit to hold any leadership position, such pressure would likely deepen divisions within the opposition.

The Knesset election and the subsequent government formation process are likely to sustain an elevated risk of disruption for travellers and personnel in Israel throughout the remainder of 2026 and likely into early 2027.

In the short term, the main election-related threat to travellers is the disruption caused by protests either for or against the Netanyahu administration, driven by issues such as the draft of ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis. Protests are likely to result in road blockades, disrupting operations in cities like Tel Aviv, and could be marked by violent clashes with security forces. Protests may also disrupt access to Ben Gurion International Airport.

The election results are likely to significantly impact the security landscape in Israel and the wider region. A victory for the opposition could impact Israeli policy towards the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon. These developments, or the continuation of previous policies in case of a victory for the Netanyahu government, would almost certainly affect the risks posed by armed conflict, terrorism, and civil unrest in Israel.

The scheduled elections will coincide with a period of growing tensions in the Middle East, which could rapidly trigger a full-scale restart of the Iran war. If renewed full-scale conflict with Iran forces the postponement of elections or significantly delays government formation, political instability and associated security risks are likely to persist well into 2027.