Guinea-Bissau Votes on Expanded Presidential Powers

On 30 August, Bissau-Guineans will vote in a referendum to approve a constitutional amendment, which was already unilaterally approved by the military-appointed National Transitional Council (NTC). The proposed constitution would preserve the formal description of Guinea-Bissau as a semi-presidential system but substantially strengthen the presidency. Voting will take place by universal, direct suffrage, with voters selecting “Yes” or “No” to the question: “[d]o you agree with the entry into force of the new Constitution of the Republic approved by the National Transitional Council?”

Under the proposed amendments, the president would serve as the head of state, direct the executive, and chair the Council of Ministers. The prime minister would remain the head of government but would become subordinate to the president. Accordingly, the president would appoint and dismiss the prime minister after consulting parliamentary parties, while retaining the power to dissolve the legislature. The National People’s Assembly, Guinea-Bissau’s parliament, would retain its legislative oversight functions, including confidence motions and approval of the government programme. It would also be renamed the National Assembly, with its membership reduced from 102 to 65 members. Additionally, parties which fail to secure at least four per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections could be dissolved. Critics have argued that the proposed changes would significantly weaken parliament’s ability to check the president, concentrating greater power in the presidency.

The vote forms part of the transition process established following the 26 November 2025 military coup. After the referendum, elections to restore civilian rule are scheduled for 6 December 2026. Transitional President General Horta N’Tam formally called the referendum through Presidential Decree No. 19/2026, after the Supreme Court assented to the process. According to a junta statement in December, neither N’Tam nor the current Prime Minister Ilídio Vieira Té will be allowed to run for president.

ASSESSMENT

Guinea-Bissau has grappled with chronic instability since becoming independent from Portugal in 1973, marked by repeated coups and ongoing political power struggles. The country has experienced at least ten successful or attempted coups, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in Africa. The most recent coup occurred in November 2025, when Guinea-Bissau’s military seized power days after the presidential election and amid competing claims of victory, but before the release of results that were widely expected to be unfavourable to President Umaro Sissoco Embaló.

The constitutional referendum is highly likely to pass. Guinea-Bissau’s shift towards a more presidential system is being framed as a means to reduce institutional conflict and political paralysis. Executive authority is currently ambiguously divided between the president and prime minister. Under Article 96 of the constitution, the prime minister-led government is the highest executive and administrative body. Conversely, Article 103 stipulates that the government is politically accountable to the president and the National People’s Assembly. This unclear division has repeatedly triggered disputes over control of the government, and only one president since 1994 has completed their term in office. As a result, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has recommended that the government draft and adopt a new constitution through referendum.

The constitutional reform will highly likely benefit the military-led transitional authority. While the government’s stated motivation is to end the repeated political deadlocks, the proposed constitutional amendments would substantially strengthen the executive ahead of the planned general elections. Alongside conferring popular legitimacy on a constitution drafted and approved under military rule, the changes would largely centralise authority in the presidency, giving one individual substantial control over the state. Additionally, it would enable the transitional authorities to decide the institutional structure under which the next government will operate, meaning that opposition parties’ powers could be significantly curtailed.

Although the transitional president and prime minister are barred from contesting the December election, the junta appears to be facilitating the return of deposed president Embaló. The Inclusive Patriotic Alliance-Cabas Garandi (API-CG), the Inclusive Alliance Platform-Terra Ranka (PAI–Terra Ranka), and human rights groups have accused the transitional authorities of clearing a path for Embaló while repressing rival political figures, including opposition leader Domingos Simões Pereira, who was detained following the 2025 coup and later placed under house arrest in January 2026. They have also criticised the exclusion of civil-society groups from the constitutional drafting process and called for the referendum to be postponed. By securing approval for the new constitution before potentially restoring Embaló to power, the junta is likely seeking to preserve substantial influence over the country through a proxy administration.

There is a realistic possibility of protests and localised violence due to the constitutional referendum. Following the November 2025 coup, hundreds of people demonstrated in Bissau to demand Pereira’s release, while several civil-society groups called for a general strike and a campaign of civil disobedience to restore “electoral truth”. Further protests took place in April 2026 after the killing of a civil-society activist, with demonstrators accusing the security forces of carrying out a politically motivated assassination. Although neither episode developed into widespread unrest, both involved clashes with the police, who used tear gas to disperse demonstrators. During the post-coup protests, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also accused the security forces of deploying lethal force, including live ammunition, against protesters.

There is also a realistic possibility that civil unrest could become widespread. Opposition and civil-society groups’ portrayal of the constitutional referendum as an attempt to legitimise military rule increases the likelihood that they will call for large-scale protests against what they regard as a sham transition process. Security forces’ previous use of live ammunition also raises the risk that initially localised demonstrations could develop into a broader movement if footage or reports of a severe crackdown circulate widely on social media. Demonstrations would likely be concentrated in Bissau, where almost one-quarter of the population lives. Focal points for demonstrations would likely include the presidential palace, the National People’s Assembly, and the National Electoral Commission.