Colombia Prepares for High-Stakes Presidential Contest

On 31 May, up to 41 million Colombians will be eligible to vote in the country’s presidential elections, which will decide the successor to incumbent President Gustavo Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking immediate re-election. If no candidate secures 50 per cent of the vote on 31 May, a run-off between the two candidates that secured the most votes will be held on 21 June.

With Petro ineligible, polls have identified three candidates who have a realistic chance of winning. Senator Iván Cepeda Castro, the candidate of the Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact, PH), currently leads the polls. PH is a left-wing alliance formed in 2025 by Petro, consisting of four parties: Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union), Polo Democrático Alternativo (Alternative Democratic Pole), the Partido Comunista Colombiano (Colombian Communist Party), and Humane Colombia (Humane Colombia). Cepeda has built a strong and diverse base and has intensified efforts to reach out to indigenous rights groups in regions such as Cauca.

Cepeda is widely expected to reach the second round. Consequently, two right-wing candidates are likely competing for the second runoff spot. Abelardo de la Espriella, of the Movimiento de Salvación Nacional (National Salvation Movement, MSN), has emerged as a populist right-wing figure with a platform and rhetoric similar to Latin American leaders like El Salvador’s Bukele or Argentina’s Milei, rooted in calls to dismantle the “establishment”, slash regulation, and crack down on organised crime. Senator Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático (Democratic Centre, CD) is a more centrist right-wing candidate, often categorised under the term “Uribismo”, after the policies of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who also endorses more hardline security policies.

The presidential elections will take place only months after the latest parliamentary contest, in March. This vote was marked by very low turnout (just over 50 per cent) and returned a fragmented chamber. The parties of the three leading candidates all achieved positive results: PH increased its seat share by five, with both CD and MSN increasing their numbers.

The campaign has been dominated by security concerns amid a major increase in militant violence across Colombia. In the past year, there have been several high-profile assassinations of political candidates, most notably the June 2025 killing of Miguel Uribe Turbay, one of the early competitors to become CD’s presidential candidate, and multiple cases of intimidation. In April 2026, Valencia claimed that an armed group had planned an assassination attempt targeting her, while President Petro alleged the existence of a plot to assassinate Cepeda.

In April and May, there have been several cases of journalists and party activists being killed, with the murders being linked to organised crime and armed groups. On 16 May, gunmen assassinated two members of de la Esprella’s campaign staff in Cubarral, Meta Department, while a member of Valencia’s electoral staff had his armoured vehicle fired upon, also in Cubarral. On 22 May, gunmen opened fire on a PH office in Flandes, Tolima Department.

ASSESSMENT

The election is widely seen as a referendum on President Petro’s flagship Paz Total or “Total Peace” policy. Petro, a former guerrilla of the leftist M-19 group, has prioritised dialogue and negotiated settlements with Colombia’s armed groups over coercion or expanded security operations under the policy. Cepeda, who was one of the principal architects of Total Peace and has served as one of Petro’s main negotiators, advocates for the continuation of the policy, despite growing scepticism. Conversely, both leading right-wing candidates have promised to abandon Total Peace and adopt more aggressive measures to combat organised crime and militancy, likely partially inspired by El Salvador’s Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) approach, which has spread throughout Latin America over the last three years.

Total Peace was implemented in 2022 and has achieved some limited successes. The policy has resulted in the creation of formal negotiation channels with several armed groups, temporary ceasefires, and the demobilisation of some smaller factions. However, it has almost certainly failed to deliver a sustained reduction in violence, curb illicit economies or dismantle the primary armed groups, with groups like the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), the FARC dissident group Estado Mayor Central (Central General Staff, EMC), and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan, AGC) still highly active across multiple regions of the country. Critics have argued that armed groups, many of which have evolved from political movements into profit-driven criminal networks, have simply exploited Total Peace and its associated ceasefires to regroup, consolidate territorial control, expand recruitment and increase extortion and other illicit revenue streams.

According to NGO Ideas para la Paz, armed groups now have approximately 27,000 fighters (up from an estimated 15,000 in 2022). Armed groups are firmly embedded within local populations, have increasingly been able to operate freely in their respective areas of influence, and have expanded territories under their control, resulting in violent competition over strategically valuable areas for narcotics production, smuggling or other illicit enterprises, such as illegal mining. Currently, the only major group the government is in negotiations with is the AGC, a violent drug cartel that has doubled its territory under Petro and increased its ranks by almost 150 per cent.

Armed groups have also emulated global trends by increasingly adopting advanced weapon systems to carry out attacks, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which they have used to drop explosives on police and military positions, often posing a direct threat to civilians. In 2025, the Ministry of Defence recorded 333 drone attacks, up from 61 the year prior.

Total Peace came under increased scrutiny in 2025, in response to an escalation of the Colombian internal conflict. Several armed groups conducted high-profile “offensives” across the country or increased attacks, primarily to expand territorial control and expand illicit economies, but also likely to challenge state authority and strengthen their bargaining position ahead of the presidential election. This has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians and likely the worst humanitarian situation in over a decade, with Colombia also currently hosting as many as 3.5 million Venezuelan refugees. Attacks on security forces and critical transport routes have increased, as has disruption to business operations in conflict-affected departments such as Catatumbo, Cauca, Valle del Cauca and parts of Antioquia. By some estimates, as many as ten million people now live under the influence of armed groups.

In January 2025, the ELN launched an offensive against FARC-dissident groups in the Catatumbo region, a key border area with Venezuela, which led to more than 100 deaths and the displacement of 50,000 people. In December, the ELN launched another series of attacks, which also affected the city of Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city and a major economic and transport hub, in the Valle del Cauca department.  

The EMC also escalated attacks in 2025 and has continued to do so in 2026. EMC’s first escalation cycle was in early 2025; however, the most significant shift was observed in June 2025, when the militant group launched a wave of coordinated attacks across the Cauca and Valle del Cauca departments, demonstrating a more organised capacity and intent to disrupt security forces, transport routes and urban centres.

Most militant attacks have concentrated on state security forces; there has been a major increase in civilian casualties. Reporting from the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) indicates that there were 965 people injured or killed by explosives, most being civilians. The report also documented 282 cases of violence against health workers related to ​the armed conflict, and 308 new disappearances. While an increased civilian casualty toll is likely partly attributable to the indiscriminate nature of explosive devices, several high-profile attacks indicate that civilians have likely been deliberately targeted or that armed groups are increasingly willing to accept civilian casualties to achieve their objectives.

The most notable of these incidents was the 25 April 2026 detonation of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), near the town of Cajibio, in the department of Cauca in southwest Colombia. The explosion, which occurred approximately one month ahead of the election, killed at least 21 people and injured dozens, and resulted in major transport disruption on one of Colombia’s most important transit corridors. Reports indicate that the bomb was detonated after assailants stopped traffic by blocking the road with a bus and another vehicle, actions that likely indicate the intent to maximise civilian casualties. The attack, which was the most brutal against civilians in decades, coincided with a series of coordinated attacks in the Valle del Cauca and Cauca departments, that was immediately attributed to the EMC.  

Militant offensives and an escalation in attacks have significantly undermined Total Peace and increasingly forced the Petro administration to adopt a more coercive approach, characterised by increased military deployments, enhanced security measures, increased operations aimed at killing or capturing militant senior leadership, and closer security cooperation with international partners, particularly the US, despite the Washington’s sustained criticism of Petro and its own controversial operations against narcotics smuggling just outside of Colombian territorial waters.

Petro’s gradual shift has almost certainly influenced the actions of militant groups. Under increased pressure and facing the threat of expanded military operations and foreign involvement, attacks like the April VBIED and other high-profile attacks are likely aimed at undermining state control and influencing the future course of action of not just the current government, but also other presidential candidates. The strategic message being sent is that government operations attempting to contain the influence of armed groups or disrupt their operations will be met with significant and costly armed resistance.

With internal security assessments almost certainly determining there is a credible risk of increased militancy up to and during the election, the Colombian government has implemented heightened security measures. Measures include the planned closure of all borders with Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Venezuela between 30 May and 1 June. More than 248,000 uniformed personnel, roughly equally provided by the police and military, will be stationed at polling stations as part of “Project Democracy”. States more exposed to armed conflict, such as Cauca, will have a higher volume of personnel deployed.

The EMC and the ELN have announced unilateral “ceasefires” between 20 May and 10 June to coincide with the vote. However, these ceasefires are unlikely to be reliable indicators of reduced election-related risks and may be attempts to distance themselves from political violence. Moreover, ceasefires are unlikely to extend to intimidation, movement restrictions or “armed strikes”, vote tampering, or other non-violent measures designed to influence turnout and local voting behaviour. During the March 2026 Colombian parliamentary elections, local election observers reported potential irregularities at more than 1,000 polling stations.  Colombian armed groups are also very decentralised, and there is a realistic possibility that ceasefire declarations made by senior leadership will not be uniformly adhered to by local commanders of factions.

Most importantly, the self-declared ceasefires do not cover the potential second round on 21 June. Polling indicates that no candidate is likely to achieve more than 50 per cent of the vote, with the second round likely to feature Cepeda against one of the right-wing candidates that has promised a much tougher stance on armed groups. As it is likely that most of the supporters of the losing right-wing candidate will shift to the remaining right-wing contender, the second round is likely to be perceived as a direct contest between an attempt to restore Total Peace and a marked shift towards expanded security operations. This would likely increase the incentive for armed groups to influence the election and could increase the risk of high-profile attacks aimed at deterring the incoming administration from abandoning the negotiation process.

The 2026 presidential election will almost certainly be highly consequential for the future trajectory of Colombia’s internal armed conflict. A Cepeda government will likely remain committed to Total Peace and reopen dialogue with armed groups, assessing that a change in president could be interpreted as an opportunity to stabilise negotiations and reverse the recent path of President Petro. However, while such a course of action has the potential to reduce violence in Colombia, it is likely to play into the hands of the armed groups, which will likely continue to exploit the policy to consolidate territorial control, expand illicit economies, delay demobilisation and potentially increase their leverage in future negotiations.

A victory by a right-wing candidate would likely result in the rapid abandonment of Total Peace. Both de la Espriella and Valencia would likely expand security operations and deploy increased resources to Colombia’s most affected areas. Both would also likely explore options to expand security cooperation with the US, mirroring developments seen elsewhere in Latin America. This could potentially involve Colombia joining the “Shield of the Americas”, increased intelligence-sharing, and even a possible pathway for US kinetic operations on Colombian territory, a development that has recently been observed in Ecuador.

However, recent developments in Colombia likely illustrate limitations to a more hardline approach. Offensives and reprisal attacks likely indicate that armed groups have yet to be deterred by expanded government operations, and incidents like the April Pan-American Highway attack or attacks within major population centres likely indicate a continued willingness to escalate despite the threat of state retaliation. Moreover, Colombia’s armed groups are well-embedded within the civilian population, highly decentralised and are adept at exploiting Colombia’s mountainous, jungle and borderlands to evade security operations. The imposition of security strategies observed elsewhere in Latin America is likely to be of limited effectiveness, given the resources required to combat multiple armed groups operating in challenging terrain on several fronts, with expanded security operations likely to provoke retaliatory attacks aimed at undermining the state’s efforts to curb militancy and disrupt illicit economies.