Brazil Prepares for Highly Polarised General Election

On 4 October, more than 150 million Brazilian nationals will be eligible to vote in the country’s general election. The elections are to nominate the president, vice-president, all 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 54 out of 81 Federal Senate members, and the governors, vice-governors, and parliamentarians of all federative units. As the president and governors need an absolute majority to win, a potential run-off vote will be held on 25 October.

At the federal level, the elections are a highly polarised contest between incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, of the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT), and challenger Flávio Bolsonaro, of the right-wing Liberal Party (PL). Flávio Bolsonaro is the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who held office between 2019 and 2023. The transition between the presidencies of Jair Bolsonaro and Lula was marked by the former’s allegation of a rigged vote, with his supporters storming the Supreme Court of Brazil, National Congress, and Planalto Presidential Palace on 8 January 2023 in an unsuccessful attempt to instigate a coup and reinstate him as president. Bolsonaro was subsequently convicted of several offences including “attempted violent abolition of the democratic rule of law”, “attempted coup d’etat”, and “armed criminal conspiracy”, and was sentenced to 27 years.

Lula currently holds a narrow lead over Flávio Bolsonaro, with a popular support difference of around four to six percentage points. However, neither candidate has the votes to win a majority in the first round, indicating that a runoff is likely. In the event of a runoff, available polling suggests that most voters supporting other candidates would favour Bolsonaro over Lula, narrowing the margin considerably. However, runoff projections continue to place Lula ahead by approximately two percentage points.

While the presidential contest is a clear two-man race, the parliamentary vote is more complex. Seats in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies are allocated proportionally within individual states, contributing to significant fragmentation across multiple parties nationwide. Available projections suggest that the PL and the PT-led federation are likely to remain among the largest forces in Congress, alongside the centre-right Progressive Union Federation (PP/União). This points to a fragmented legislature in which centre and centre-right parties are likely to retain significant influence, with neither Bolsonaro- nor Lula-aligned blocs expected to secure a clear majority.

The final weeks before the vote have been marked by growing disinformation and challenges to electoral integrity and to candidates’ security. Authorities have identified and publicly denounced several online misinformation campaigns reporting widespread rigging to doctor the election results. Authorities have also noted a growing threat from foreign interference. In late August, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) reportedly raised the risk of US influence or interference in the 2026 election to a ‘criticality level’ and assessed that pressure on Brazil was intensifying. Moreover, there is a threat of intimidation or violence against voters and candidates from organised criminal groups. The Federal Police has established a nationwide protection operation for candidates involving more than 450 personnel, armoured vehicles, counter-drone equipment and intelligence teams. Federal troops have also been authorised to reinforce election security in 11 states, including 129 municipalities in Amazonas and Pará alone.

ASSESSMENT

Similar to many recent campaigns in LATAM, much of the Brazilian electoral campaign has been focused on issues of security. Several large, multinational organised criminal groups operate in Brazil, the largest being Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV). These groups have increasingly expanded into the country’s north from their southern strongholds, seeking to establish new drug trafficking routes or to exercise greater control over illegal mining, logging and other illicit operations in the Amazon. They have also established alliances with smaller groups, strengthening them in the process and thus creating more opportunities for violent competition. The expansion of narcotics trafficking routes, including to Europe and West Africa, has provoked a surge in violence between criminal groups in states like Bahia, which is currently one of the least-secure areas of Brazil.

The current government of Brazil has sought to counter the growth of criminal groups by deepening coordination between various levels of government, from the local and city levels to the federal government. Researchers have noted that the significant independence that each state government has in setting its own counter-cartel strategy has resulted in uneven coverage and a lack of a coherent approach to combating organised crime nationwide. In 2025, the government proposed a constitutional amendment to strengthen the Unified Public Security System, originally created in 2018, by increasing coordination and standardising aspects of policing and public-security policy across Brazil. However, constitutional limits on Brasília’s ability to directly deploy federal forces against organised crime have constrained the federal government’s operational role. This has likely encouraged the Lula administration to place greater emphasis on disrupting the illegal economies that sustain criminal groups, including through measures such as the 2026 Anti-Faction Law.

The lack of coordination between states has also contributed to periodic, highly violent anti-cartel operations at the local level. These have resulted in significant casualties but have generally failed to materially weaken the underlying structures or operational resilience of the criminal groups. The most notable example is the October 2025 “Operation Containment”, a raid in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro targeting the leadership of CV. The raid escalated into a battle throughout the settlements, resulting in more than 120 deaths, making it the deadliest police operation in Brazil’s history. The operation failed to inflict meaningful damage on CV (local police leaders stated that its impact had been “minimal”), and resulted in significant protests and criticism against the government in Rio de Janeiro.

While foreign policy has been a relatively secondary topic in the electoral campaign, the upcoming election is highly likely to be consequential for the geopolitical orientation of South America. During the Lula presidency, Brazil has become a notable global promoter of a “multipolar” diplomacy for the LATAM region, based on engagement with China and Russia via the BRICS bloc, and resistance to an expanded US role in Latin America. Lula has also promoted greater “de-dollarisation”, including expanded use of the Brazilian real and Chinese renminbi in bilateral trade and financial transactions, reducing reliance on the US dollar.

However, since 2023, the electoral victories of several right-wing candidates in LATAM, who have generally espoused pro-US foreign policies, have made Brazil’s position progressively more distinct in the region. The capture of President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela in January 2026 and the more recent election of right-wing President Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia have also deprived the Lula administration of two key allies, leaving it increasingly isolated.

Brazil is now increasingly surrounded by members of the US-backed “Shield of the Americas”, an anti-cartel initiative centred on closer security and political cooperation with Washington. Against this backdrop, Lula has adopted a more overtly anti-US campaign position, advocating greater strategic autonomy and reduced dependence on Washington. Most recently, in his opening address at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City in September, Lula stated that “Brazil does not fit in anyone’s backyard” and warned of the US’s “hegemonic temptations” and “neocolonial incursions”. 

Flávio Bolsonaro has styled himself after other right-wing LATAM leaders, like Argentine President Javier Milei or Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, and ran a campaign based on an anti-crime stance and on greater cooperation with the US. Bolsonaro has pledged to classify the country’s cartels as terrorist organisations, matching the US’s classification of them as “foreign terrorist organisations” (FTOs), and to join the “Shield of the Americas”. He also vowed to enter a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US and suggested greater cooperation over rare earths, a strategic priority for Washington. While reiterating his intentions to take a “pragmatic” stance towards China, Bolsonaro has signalled that he will reverse course from his rival’s policy of tightening relations with Beijing.

There is a realistic possibility that the final days of the electoral campaign, and the voting day itself, will be marked by civil unrest, with the threat likely to be higher in the aftermath of the vote. In 2022, protests erupted almost immediately after Lula was declared the winner of the runoff vote. Pro-Bolsonaro supporters erected more than 300 barricades across the country using trucks and other heavy vehicles, and staged hundreds of protests. Protesters also attempted to invade the perimeter of Guarulhos International Airport in São Paulo. The unrest culminated in the 8 January attack on the main government buildings in Brasília.

Demonstrations, particularly after a presidential candidate is announced as the winner, could escalate into roadblocks, vehicle convoys, or attempts to obstruct key transport routes, resulting in delays on major roads, restricted access to airports, and disruption to public transport. The risk is likely to be highest in major political centres and large cities, particularly Brasília, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro.

There is a realistic possibility of targeted political violence being carried out by rival supporters. This also has a precedent after the 2022 elections, when an individual tried to carry out a bombing at Brasília International Airport. In another case, a person was arrested in Brasília as he tried to enter a street celebration for Lula’s inauguration while armed with an improvised explosive device (IED) and a knife.

Alongside civil unrest, there is a threat of violence linked to organised criminal groups. Groups like CV and PCC are likely to retain an interest in influencing the election of candidates, particularly those competing for state-level positions, due to Brazil’s devolution of policing power to individual states. Criminal groups may seek to threaten voters, prevent them from visiting stations, or carry out actions aimed at disrupting the voting process. In 2022, local media reported several cases of criminal groups seeking to influence the vote, including by using intimidation tactics such as circulating written warnings telling residents which candidate they should vote for. These incidents appeared localised, rather than part of a nationwide or even state-wide campaign. However, it is likely that similar incidents will take place during the upcoming election as criminal groups seek to protect local political and economic interests.

An election victory for Lula would almost certainly strengthen the government’s political mandate, and reinforce its position as the key power counterbalancing US influence in the region. A second consecutive term for Lula (his fourth overall) would allow Brazil to deepen bilateral ties within the BRICS bloc, particularly with China. Lula’s pledge to prioritise national sovereignty and safeguard Brazil’s natural resources, including critical mineral reserves, would almost certainly further strain relations with the US. Moreover, the administration would likely leverage strained relations between the US and EU to deepen ties with the latter, building on the recently approved EU-Mercosur trade deal.

Lula may agree to some security cooperation with Washington to combat transnational criminal groups, particularly in Brazil’s northwestern borders with Colombia and Venezuela, but is unlikely to agree to allow US counter-narcotics operations on its soil. Discrepancies between the Shield of the Americas framework and Brazil’s independent approach to combating organised crime are likely to continue causing occasional diplomatic friction between Brasília and Washington. In the long term, exclusion from US-led anti-cartel initiatives could displace criminal activity into Brazilian territory as enforcement pressure increases in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and other regional states.

A Bolsonaro victory would likely bring Brazil into closer alignment with the US and strengthen the Shield of the Americas framework. At its launch, the initiative excluded Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, despite these countries hosting some of the region’s most powerful criminal organisations. As in Colombia under De La Espriella, a Bolsonaro administration would likely pursue much closer integration of US intelligence, military and law-enforcement capabilities into Brazilian anti-cartel operations, expanding Washington’s ability to support action against organised criminal groups across the continent.

Bolsonaro would also highly likely implement a hardline policing approach towards organised criminal groups, partnering with ideologically aligned state administrations. This could drive the internal displacement of criminal groups towards states where policing is less aggressive or enforcement capacity is weaker, potentially shifting rather than reducing organised-crime activity. Bolsonaro could, like President Milei in Argentina, reverse the previous trend of growing relations with China and Russia, leading to a reduced role within BRICS in favour of greater cooperation with the US. However, this would likely not result in moves that are deliberately hostile to China, as Brasília cannot afford to alienate its main trading partner. Closer ties with the US would likely focus on areas of key interest to Washington, such as rare earth minerals or the control over irregular migration.