Ethiopia Elections Face Security and Legitimacy Challenges

On 1 June, general elections are set to take place in Ethiopia, the seventh held under the post-1995 constitutional order. Voters will elect 547 members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), the lower house of Ethiopia’s parliament, for five-year terms. Members are elected in single-member constituencies through a first-past-the-post system. Voters do not directly elect the prime minister. Instead, the House of Peoples’ Representatives selects the prime minister, meaning the party or coalition that secures a parliamentary majority is expected to form the government. Council elections, electing 2,916 regional councillors, will also be held across 12 regions, as well as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, with those councils subsequently electing representatives to the House of Federation, Ethiopia’s upper house.

Incumbent Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will lead the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) into the election, following its dominant victory in 2021, which resulted in the party securing 457 of the 547 seats in parliament. The National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), a right-wing Amhara ethnic nationalist party led by Belete Molla, is the most visible opposition party, but it currently holds only five parliamentary seats. Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA), a liberal party led by Berhanu Nega, holds just four seats. Two Oromo nationalist parties, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), led by Merera Gudina and Dawud Ibsa Ayana, respectively, boycotted the 2021 election. The OFC is fielding candidates in the 2026 election to preserve its legal registration, while the OLF has signalled readiness to contest the election.

Amid widespread instability due to ongoing civil wars in Amhara and Oromia, as well as heightened tensions in Tigray, election officials are implementing a three-tier security classification system nationwide. Red areas will be designated unfit for voting, yellow areas require mitigation, monitoring, or additional security measures, and green areas are stable enough for normal electoral operations. In previous elections, seats were left vacant in constituencies where voting could not take place, with polls postponed or cancelled in some areas because of insecurity, logistical constraints, or political disputes.

ASSESSMENT

While Prime Minister Ahmed has declared this is the “best” election to date, with 47 registered parties and nearly 11,000 candidates, several challenges remain. The legitimacy of the upcoming election has already been called into question, with tensions in multiple major regions, including Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray, where limited participation is likely to result in claims of election manipulation. This is exacerbated by the fact that most parties participating in the election broadly align with the PP, allowing the government to present the election as competitive without risking any real competition. Opposition parties are expected to remain largely sidelined, as they were in 2021, when the PP won 96.8 per cent of parliamentary seats. It is highly likely that PP will again secure an overwhelming victory. 

Furthermore, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) faces significant legitimacy challenges. In 2021, NEBE struggled to register internally displaced persons, a problem that is highly likely to continue in 2026, given Ethiopia’s continued displacement crisis and the absence of a recent census. Although the African Union (AU) assessed the 2021 election as broadly “peaceful” and “orderly”, the International Republican Institute/National Democratic Institute (IRI/NDI) observer mission concluded that the process “fell short of key standards concerning human and civil liberties, electoral campaigning, adequate security for all parties, and overall peace and security.” 

These shortcomings are likely to negatively influence perceptions of NEBE’s neutrality and capacity in the upcoming election. This is particularly since many areas are excluded from voting, and displacement and administrative gaps are likely to result in inaccurate voter rolls, under-registration, and contested results. As a result, even if NEBE can administer polling in secure areas, the election is likely to face renewed questions over inclusivity, competitiveness and national legitimacy.

Amhara

The designation of some areas in Amhara as “red”, which means unfit to vote, almost certainly threatens to exacerbate regional tensions. While Amhara and Oromia are two of Ethiopia’s most populous regions, the ongoing internal armed conflicts in both regions render accurate polling near impossible. In Amhara, conflict has been ongoing since the federal government’s 2023 decision to dismantle regional special forces. At least 12,000 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced. The fragmented Fano armed movement controls over 80 per cent of rural territory, with the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) largely restricted to major towns and highways. In March 2026, Fano issued a warning that any entity assisting the electoral process will be considered “enemies of the Amhara people equal to the government”. Voting will almost certainly be restricted to urban areas under government control, and many citizens are unlikely to vote due to the risk of polling stations or voters being targeted by Fano. 

Oromia

The situation is similar in Oromia, where the OLA has fought government forces since 2018/2019, with at least 5,000 people killed. The insurgency has seen civilian killings, mass kidnappings, and numerous transport strikes with enforced road closures. On 23 March, OLF-OLA issued a statement dismissing the election as a “performance staged for foreign consumption” and claiming that over 70 per cent of the country is inaccessible for voting.

The OFC and, despite its criticism of the election, OLF’s potential participation almost certainly gives the 2026 election more formal pluralism than a complete boycott would, with the government able to present the presence of Oromo nationalist parties as evidence of inclusion. However, OFC leader Gudina has argued that opposition parties cannot safely move, campaign, list candidates, organise observers, or mobilise supporters outside Addis Ababa. As with Amhara, the restrictions on polling in Oromia are highly likely to deepen the grievances of excluded populations. Even so, OFC and OLF participation highly likely lowers the risk of major electoral violence in Oromia, with armed groups unlikely to target polling infrastructure.

Tigray

During the general elections, the post-war Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) was expected to give way to a regular elected regional council. In May 2025, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was deregistered by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), meaning Tigray’s dominant political force is effectively unable to contest the 2026 elections. Additionally, the House of Federation has ruled that elections for the HPR will be held in five contested constituencies, but without corresponding elections for Tigray regional council seats under Tigray’s administration. This means that the vote has been perceived as politically illegitimate, with the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) stating that “territorial integrity is non-negotiable”.

Tensions have escalated over the past year, with clashes between the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) and the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) in early 2026. On 8 April 2026, the government unilaterally extended the mandate of the TIA, raising doubts over whether Tigray would transition from the interim administration to an elected regional council and regular constitutional governance through the 1 June electoral process. On 5 May, in response to the mandate extension, the TPLF replaced the government-backed leader, Tadesse Werede, with Debretsion Gebremichael, who had been Tigray’s leader during the 2020-2022 conflict. This was part of a reinstatement of the Tigray Government Assembly (parliament), which has displaced the TIA as the governing framework and revived the pre-war regional government structure. Tadesse warned that such a move would annul the 2022 Pretoria agreement, which ended the civil war which killed over 100,000 and displaced nearly three million.

The restoration of the pre-war parliament almost certainly increases the risk of a renewed confrontation in Tigray, particularly if either side attempts to militarily enforce its claimed authority. The 2020 conflict began after the TPLF rejected the government’s decision to postpone national elections and held its own regional election in Tigray, which the government declared illegal. The government’s handling of the elections in Tigray has been highly likely perceived as an attempt to retain control over the region and prevent its transition to self-governance. By declaring an end to the interim administration, the TPLF are almost certainly threatening the legal-political basis of the post-Pretoria Agreement transition. The election will highly likely reflect the ongoing fracture between the government and Tigray’s leadership and could serve as a flashpoint for either side to attempt to exert its control over the region, which almost certainly risks reigniting the conflict.

Because of the restricted participation in the conflict regions, limited civil unrest is highly likely. Demonstrations have taken place in Addis Ababa over tensions in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray in recent years. The regions’ partial exclusion from the upcoming elections, combined with the escalating dispute over Tigray, almost certainly raises the risk of demonstrations during the election. Addis Ababa hosts an estimated 500,000 to one million Tigrayans, with the federal government perceived to be sidelining Tigrayan self-determination in favour of continuing the TIA led by the government-backed Tadesse.

However, any unauthorised pro-opposition rallies are highly likely to see a severe crackdown, while authorities will likely allow some smaller, less overtly anti-government demonstrations to take place under heavy monitoring. For example, in February 2025, Tigrayans living in Addis Ababa held a peaceful anti-war rally, but were forced to submit slogans to the Addis Ababa Administration for approval. Other planned pro-Tigray rallies in November 2024 were banned by the government, with the organisers placed under arrest. Should demonstrations proceed without permission, security forces are likely to respond forcefully, using tear gas and mass arrests to deter further demonstrations, imposing internet outages to disrupt mobilisation, and potentially using live ammunition if protests escalate and threaten key government sites or security forces.