Benin Election Raises Protest and Coup Risk

On 12 April, presidential elections are set to take place in Benin. The president is elected through a two-round system to a five-year term. If no candidate wins a majority in the first round, the two leading candidates will face each other in a runoff held within 15 days of the initial vote. Presidents are limited to two five-year terms. Each presidential candidate must run with a vice-presidential running mate, who also has a five-year term and must complete the president’s term if the president is impeached or is otherwise unable to govern.

The elections follow parliamentary elections on 11 January, whereby two parties aligned with incumbent President Patrice Talon, Bloc Républicain (BR) and the Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UPR), won all 109 seats in the National Assembly. The main opposition party, Les Démocrates, finished third with a meaningful national vote share. However, Benin’s electoral code requires a party to clear a 20 per cent threshold in each electoral district to qualify for seat allocation, preventing Les Démocrates from winning any seats.

Only two candidates have been approved by the Constitutional Court to contest the presidential elections. President Talon has reached his constitutional term limits, nearing the end of his second term in power, and is barred from running again. Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni is running as the overwhelming favourite. Representing the ruling coalition of the BR and the UPR, he represents a continuity of Talon’s leadership. Opposing him is Paul Hounkpè, former mayor of Bopa and leader of the Forces cauris pour un Bénin émergent (FCBE) party. Hounkpè ran as a vice-presidential candidate during the 2021 presidential elections.

The main threat to Wadagni, Renaud Agbodjo, presidential nominee of Les Démocrates, was barred from contesting the election by the Constitutional Court. The ban was implemented on a technicality that he did not obtain a sufficient number of endorsements from members of parliament and that the party failed to pay the registration fee. Agbodjo, also a lawyer, is widely recognised, having defended numerous high-profile opposition politicians from alleged politically motivated charges.

Wadagni is running on a platform of continuity, while promising new policies, such as creating new development hubs across the country and expanding access to healthcare. His campaign also emphasises his achievements as Finance Minister, such as tripling the national budget and bringing Benin’s GDP growth to the highest in over 20 years. Under Talon’s presidency, real per capita incomes increased by 27 per cent over the past 10 years, and infant mortality rates have declined by 25 per cent. Hounkpè, on the other hand, lacks a strong unified opposition coalition behind him and is operating in a system that favours incumbency and constrains opposition mobilisation.

ASSESSMENT

While positive economic developments have marked Talon’s presidency, so has an increasing crackdown on the opposition, increasing concerns that he would not relinquish power. Talon’s government has imposed numerous obstructions on opposition parties since 2019, including excessive party registration fees, a “certificate of conformity” that serves as a legal filter, the use of a special terrorism court to try political opponents, and requirements that presidential candidates gain the endorsement of members of parliament. This, combined with the effective barring of meaningful opposition, almost certainly heightens the risk of opposition figures accusing the government of running a fraudulent election.

In the background of the election is the escalating insurgency in northern Benin. Benin is one of the most affected coastal West African states by the spillover of terrorism from the neighbouring Sahel region. The primary threat is from the Katiba Hanifa faction of the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which promotes divisive intercommunal messages while engaging in extortion and illicit trafficking. The group was responsible for an attack which killed 54 Beninese soldiers in April 2025 and another attack which killed 15 in March 2026. Overall, an estimated 375 people have been killed over the past year in Benin at the hands of insurgent groups. 

The rising insurgency-related violence led to a military coup attempt on 7 December, when a military faction, calling itself the Military Committee for Refoundation and led by Lieutenant Colonel Tigri Pascal, appeared on Benin’s state television and announced the dissolution of the government and national institutions, the suspension of the constitution, and the closure of land, air, and sea borders. With the help of Nigerian air and ground support, the coup attempt was quickly put down. This was the second such attempt since 1977, with an alleged coup plot also disrupted in January 2024. This almost certainly suggests a division between the government and the military and significantly raises the risk of further military coup attempts should electoral violence break out.

To ease fears of the escalating violence, Wadagni has conducted numerous campaign rallies in northern Benin to represent the government’s control over its territory. Furthermore, he has promised to establish municipal police forces in border towns in the north to defend against insurgent attacks. Analysts have noted that the ongoing insurgencies will likely motivate the government to increasingly crack down on opposition in an attempt to consolidate control over the country. This is highly likely, with the recent 7 December attempted coup likely to be used as a pretext for consolidating control by the ruling party and further cracking down on opposition.

While widespread demonstrations following the presidential election may be avoided due to Benin’s strong economy over the past decade, fuel price increases caused by the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz have already triggered minor protests. There is also a historical precedent of post-election unrest, with clashes taking place in May 2019 after opposition parties were excluded from the election. This resulted in the security forces using live ammunition, rubber bullets, and water cannon to deter further protests, which killed at least two. There is a realistic possibility of similar protests being staged, particularly if the election is perceived as rigged, with the security forces likely to again respond with force, which could exacerbate unrest.